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ABSTRACT 
The Ethiopian floriculture industry is relatively young and yet has rapidly expanded to 
emerge as the fifth largest flower exporter worldwide. The success was driven by local 
investment combined with foreign direct investment, and actively supported by targeted 
industrial policy from the government as well as development cooperation, particularly from 
the Dutch government. Although foreign firms dominate the industry now, local firms have 
participated since its inception and were involved in pioneering the sector. This paper 
measures and analyses the technological capabilities, competitiveness and export trajectories 
of Ethiopian-owned firms engaged in cut-flower production for export. It constructs a 
technological capability matrix that describes the specific capabilities required to enter and 
operate in different parts of the floriculture global value chain, adjusted for the specificities 
of the Ethiopian industry, and uses this matrix to design a local firm survey to assess firms’ 
capabilities across four categories: product and production process, input integration, 
linkages and end-market. The survey was carried out with almost all local firms. The 
aggregate technological capability scores show that all firms have developed their 
capabilities, as they scored medium and above in most categories. However, none of the 
firms except one showed a uniform score across the four capability categories, which means 
that firms did not build all categories of capabilities to the same level. The paper also 
analyses firms’ technological capabilities compared to measures of competitiveness, which 
underscores the complexity and dynamism of the relationship between capabilities and 
competitiveness. The findings show that firms can increase their competitiveness (measured 
in terms of unit price) by selectively deepening capabilities that are important to meeting the 
requirements of the targeted market channel. In sum, the different export trajectories among 
firms can explain some of the discrepancy between capabilities and competitiveness. 
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African-owned firms building capabilities in global value chains (AFRICAP) 
AFRICAP examines industrialization in African countries in the context of 
increasingly globalized production networks coordinated through transnational 
inter-firm linkages. African-owned firms often struggle to enter new export sectors 
in manufacturing and agro-processing, to remain competitive within them, and to 
capture greater value. AFRICAP focuses on firm-level capability building and 
combines this firm level analysis with an understanding of global value chains and 
national institutional factors. The project analyzes various channels that facilitate 
learning among firms: industrial policies, foreign direct investment linkages, and 
firm-specific networks and experience.  
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Ethiopian-owned firms in the floriculture global value chain: 
With what capabilities? 
Introduction 
The Ethiopian floriculture industry was pioneered in the 1990s by local entrepreneurs and 
rapidly emerged as one of the largest floriculture industry in the world. The success was driven 
by local investment combined with foreign direct investment, and actively supported by 
targeted industrial policy from the government as well as development cooperation, particularly 
from the Dutch government. The floriculture industry is an important source of foreign 
exchange and employment in Ethiopia, as it has generated around USD 162 million foreign 
exchange per annum between 2006/07 and 2014/15 and employed about 50,000 people. The 
Ethiopian floriculture industry includes roses, summer flowers and cuttings, covering over 
1,600 hectares of land under modern greenhouses, but rose production is dominant, accounting 
for over 80% of the total cultivation.1 The main export destination is the Netherlands, followed 
by Saudi Arabia, Norway and the United Arab Emirates. 
Both local and foreign firms have been operating in the Ethiopian floriculture industry, but over 
time foreign firms assumed greater dominance. In 2016, out of a total of 82 firms, 15 had full 
local ownership and one was a joint-venture between local and foreign investors. We initially 
included the joint venture in the definition of locally owned firms, assuming that the local 
investors were active partners. Of these 16 local firms, two were collapsing. The firms still 
actively operating were described by an industry expert as ‘gold tested by fire’, due to their 
resilience after shocks to the industry from the global financial crisis that began around 2008.  
This paper is part of the AfriCap research project, which aims to advance our understanding of 
how and why African-owned firms build the technological capabilities required to enter and 
remain competitive within new export sectors such as floriculture. It asks why local 
entrepreneurs invest in these new economic activities and how they learn to become competitive 
in globalized industries. In particular, the project is interested in the factors that facilitate 
learning among local firms, especially in the risky contexts of African countries in which there 
are many constraints on productivity that have to be addressed not only at the firm level but also 
at the industry and national levels. This situation raises the following questions: why do local 
investors take this risk, what factors explain whether they succeed in becoming competitive, and 
1 Cut-flower production for export is concentrated within a 200 kilometer radius around Addis Ababa, the 
capital, where Bole international airport is located. 
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what factors explain variation in the overall capabilities and competitiveness among local firms. 
As the first step in this research, we must know what kind of capabilities local firms actually 
have. 
In a previous working paper, the AfriCap research team presented our conceptualization of what 
it means to build capabilities within global value chains and developed a technological 
capability matrix that describes the specific capabilities required to enter and operate in different 
parts of the floriculture global value chain (Staritz et al. 2017). The matrix, which is presented 
again in this paper, was constructed based on a background study of the floriculture global value 
chain, as well as background research on the Ethiopian floriculture industry and a mapping of 
the local firms and their capabilities based on what was already known from secondary 
literature and previous fieldwork on the industry.2 A local firm survey questionnaire was 
developed based on the matrix, and the survey was carried out with 13 of the 15 fully Ethiopian-
owned firms exporting cut-flowers in June 2016. This paper presents the findings from the 
survey of Ethiopian-owned firms engaged in cut-flower production for export. It measures and 
analyzes the technological capabilities, competitiveness and export trajectories of these firms.  
The first part of the paper presents a summary of the Ethiopian floriculture industry, focusing on 
the emergence and evolution of the industry as a whole. It concludes by presenting the locally 
owned firms still operating in the industry as of 2016 and identifying characteristics of their 
owners, based on fieldwork carried out in preparation for the local firm survey. The second part 
of the paper analyzes the results of the local firm survey, scoring firms on indicators grouped 
within four categories of capabilities: product and production process, input integration, 
linkages and end-market. Each firm is given a sum score for each capability category as well as 
an aggregate technological capability score, on a scale of low, medium and high.  
Local firms in the Ethiopian floriculture industry have aggregate capability scores ranging from 
high, medium-high, medium, to low-medium. The firm survey results, which also included 
questions on initial experience and investment, show that most of the local firms considerably 
deepened their technological capabilities since they started operations. The capability scoring 
also shows significant variation in scores across the four categories of capabilities. This 
variation indicates that local firms did not build all types of capabilities to the same level. 
Instead, they appear to invest in building capabilities selectively.  
2 The author conducted fieldwork on the Ethiopian floriculture industry in 2009, interviewing key informants to 
assess the overall performance of the sector in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Fieldwork was also undertaken in 
2014 and 2015 for a different project that included interviewing some local and foreign firms. Although that research 
focused on labor, and included a labor survey and life story records of flower farm workers, it touched upon general 
features of the firms and involved in-depth discussions with key managers, repeated visits to farms and farm 
observations. In writing this paper, the author sometimes draws upon on this previous research.     
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Firms’ technological capabilities are also compared to measures of competitiveness in order to 
assess whether there are clear correlations between building technological capabilities and 
export performance in terms of export value, export volume and unit price. The comparison of 
firms’ capability scores to several different types of competitiveness measures highlights the 
complexity and dynamism of the relationship between capabilities and competitiveness, as firms 
experienced not only rapid growth but also stagnant periods and even setbacks. The complexity 
of the relationship between capabilities and competitiveness, as well as the potential influence 
on firms’ investment in learning, was further studied by examining price. Firms that specialized 
in the Dutch auction market channel and developed the specific capabilities required to perform 
well in this market—consistency in quality, quantity and presence at the auction—obtained 
higher unit prices in the auction than local firms which operated in multiple market channels, 
and thus had trouble achieving as high a level of consistency in the Dutch auction. This finding 
indicates that firms can increase their competitiveness (measured in term of unit price) by 
selectively deepening capabilities that are important to meeting the requirements of the targeted 
market channel.  
Based on this analysis, local firms are categorized into three groups based on their export 
trajectories: firms that largely sell via Dutch auction but try to diversify to all kinds of end-
markets (trajectory 1); firms that sell via direct sales only (trajectory 2); and firms that sell via 
Dutch auction only (trajectory 3). There is still a divergence in firms’ capability and 
competitiveness measures within the same trajectory, which might be a result of the 
idiosyncratic learning processes of each firm. Half of the six firms in trajectory 1 exhibit 
relatively stronger performances in both capabilities and competitiveness measures, while the 
other half have mixed results. Firms in this trajectory face the challenge of meeting different 
specifications of several end-markets in a consistent manner and the process might sometimes 
cause mismatches in their capabilities and competitiveness. Although the two firms in trajectory 
2 appear to face similar challenges, they were better able to overcome these challenges using 
their personal networks in marketing and because they operated mostly under contract 
arrangements, in contrast to firms in trajectory 1 which operated in the Dutch auction (which is 
not a contract arrangement). In terms of the aggregate capability score, one of the firms scored 
medium-high, while the other showed a mixed score. The three firms in Trajectory 3 appear to 
be more consistent in terms of scoring relatively similar results in both capability and 
competitiveness. One firm scored medium-high in capabilities, while the other two both scored 
medium.  
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Part I:  Evolution of the Ethiopian Floriculture Industry 
This part of the paper discusses the evolution of the Ethiopian floriculture industry in the 
context of the floriculture global value chain. Although the origin of the Ethiopian industry is 
traced back to state-owned firms that operated in the 1980s, the current form of the industry is 
directly related to two local entrepreneurs who pioneered the private-owned flower export 
business in the 1990s. Despite the considerable effort of these two firms, the industry failed to 
succeed initially due to the lack of appropriate infrastructure and government support as well as 
the entrepreneurs’ limited knowledge in a highly competitive global market.  Thanks to the 
creation of sector-specific institutions, active industrial policy and official development 
cooperation, those bottlenecks were largely removed and entry barriers were considerably 
reduced, which led to rapid growth in the sector. Since 2004/5, the industry experienced a large 
inflow of local and foreign investment and an expansion of sector-specific national capabilities. 
However, the global financial crisis of 2008 negatively impacted the industry and crowded out 
large numbers of firms, especially locally owned ones. As a result, foreign firms have come to 
dominate the industry, and only a small number of domestic firms remain in operation. Despite 
the stiff competition in the floriculture global value chain, in 2015, the Ethiopian industry 
appeared as the fifth largest exporter of flowers worldwide.  
The inception and development 
The beginning of floriculture production for export can be traced back to the 1980s. The 
communist government (1975-1991), commonly referred as the derg, established two state-
owned horticulture firms with their own marketing and distribution centers (Etfruit3) based in 
domestic and foreign markets (World Bank 2004). The state-owned firms produced summer 
flowers on a small scale, next to their main products, which were fruits and vegetables. 
Although the flower production of these firms was short lived, the knowledge and the market 
network provided a foundation for the modern floriculture development in the country.   
 The contemporary floriculture industry of Ethiopia was built more directly upon the 
experiences of two locally owned private firms, Meskel Flower PLC and Ethio-flora PLC, 
which were established in the early 1990s near Lake Ziway, 160km south of Addis Ababa. 
3 The two state-owned firms were called Upper Awash Agro Industry Enterprise (UAAIE) and Horticulture 
Development Enterprise (HDE). Although growing flowers on the state-owned firms began under the derg regime, 
the establishment of the firms (at least one of them) dates back to the 1970s, during the reign of Haile Selassie I 
(1930-1974), and it was founded as a joint venture (local and foreign).  Under the derg regime, both firms and Etfruit 
(the marketing and distribution center) were state-owned. For some time all the three firms stayed public firms under 
the incumbent government, but substantial parts of the land they held was leased for floriculture in Ziway. In 2013, 
UAAIE was privatized and sold to MIDROC, the diversified business group owned by Mohammed Hussein Ali Al-
'Amoudi.  Etfruit and HDE still exist, but their ownership structure is not clear; they appear to be fully or partially 
privatized. 
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Meskel flower PLC was founded in 1992 by a former pilot who was educated in the USA and 
had a dream to set up his own business in Ethiopia. He made a considerable search effort in 
realizing his dream, including visiting commercial farms in the USA and the Netherlands, 
looking for international support from the World Bank and studying a detailed soil map of 
Ethiopia in order to find the appropriate location in terms of climate, soil and water (UNCTAD 
2002). An UNCTAD report on investment and innovation policy in Ethiopia identified Meskel 
Flower PLC as a successful flower exporting firm that could have an important demonstration 
effect in attracting foreign direct investment and local investors to the sector if the necessary 
institutional support and appropriate physical infrastructure that were missing at that time could 
be provided. These two locally owned private firms made a substantial effort in a difficult 
business environment, but they lacked institutional support and appropriate infrastructure and 
they faced tough competition in the European market from highly experienced Kenyan and 
Dutch firms. As a result, Ethio-flora was forced to shift into fruit and vegetable production for 
export. These were less technologically intensive products in which the firm benefited more 
directly from the knowledge and network created by the state-owned firms such as Etfruit, 
through which Ethio-flora exported its products (World Bank 2004). Meskel Flower PLC 
reported that the tough competition pushed the firm to learn more about the market side of the 
business, and it eventually found out the potential of Germany’s market for higher value 
products such as roses (UNCTAD 2002). As a result, Meskel Flower shifted into rose 
production, establishing the first rose growing firm in 1999. Unfortunately, it ceased operations 
in 2001 due to the arrest of its owner.4 
The effort of Ethiopian-owned private firms to enter the floriculture global value chain in the 
1990s partly coincided with changing dynamics at the global level. Traditionally, cut-flower 
production and consumption were concentrated in the so-called Global North, and Europe was 
the largest market. Between the 1980s and 1990s, the Netherlands became an international 
flower hub with the biggest flower auction houses (Labaste 2005). The Netherlands was the 
main site of production, import and re-export of flowers. However, several developing countries 
such as Kenya, Colombia, Ecuador and then Ethiopia emerged as important countries producing 
and exporting cut-flowers.5 As a result, the Dutch auction, which was the dominant market 
channel in the floriculture global value chain, took several measures to protect its position. One 
of the central challenges for the Dutch auction was to adjust to ‘…the remapping of the world’s 
production of and market for cut-flowers’ in the 1990s (Patel-Campillo 2011:91). One of the 
4 The owner of Meskel flower (Eskinder Yoseph) was jailed in 2001-2 on an alleged corruption charge, which likely 
was politically motivated. 
5 The history and evolution of the floriculture global value chain, and contemporary dynamics of the floriculture 
GVC, are analyzed in detail in a forthcoming working paper. 
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adjustment measures taken to protect Dutch growers included banning foreign products from 
the auction market in 1994. This ban pushed foreign firms6 to establish their own electronic 
auction system, the Tele Flower Auction, which allowed them to bypass the Dutch auction. This 
event brought developing country producers and European buyers closer, encouraging direct 
sourcing, in particular between Kenyan and UK firms (Patel-Capellio 2011; Taylor 2011).  
Although the ban at the Dutch auction was reversed in the late 1990s, the adjustment process 
took a long time, which probably forced newcomers, like the Ethiopian pioneers and early 
entrants, to search for a new market or to shift to another sector. Moreover, at the time of the 
Ethiopian firms’ entry into the floriculture global value chain, the export market was becoming 
more competitive as supply from developing countries increased and even outstripped demand. 
Concomitant with the increasing supply, however, was end-market specialization of supplier 
countries based on geographical proximity, which somewhat reduced competitive pressures. 
The major producers of Latin American countries such as Colombia and Ecuador continued 
catering predominantly to the US market, and Sub-Saharan African countries, such as Ethiopia, 
Kenya, and Uganda, mainly exported to European countries, where the largest consumers and 
traders resided (Rikken 2010). 
Despite their failure to succeed in the global floriculture industry, the effort of the two pioneer 
firms, Meskel Flower and Ethio-flora, had a demonstration effect. The experience of these 
pioneer firms informed the decision of Golden Rose Agro PLC to enter the sector in 1999, 
which was also the first foreign direct investment in the industry (Gebreeyesus and Iizuka 
2012).7 Although Golden Rose had no prior experience in floriculture, it had high investment 
capabilities and a willingness to take risks. It became the first firm to adopt modern 
technologies, such as a steel-based greenhouse, in the Ethiopian floriculture sector. It also 
demonstrated the potential of the country to grow high-quality roses as well as the importance 
of pre-investment decisions for capitalizing on that potential: for example, by choosing an 
appropriate location and associated technologies (Ibid). 
Golden Rose began selling via the Dutch auction in 2001, but declining prices and 
disproportional service costs forced the firm to search for a new market, just like the pioneer 
local firms had to do. In a few months, it abandoned the auction channel and started direct sales 
6 This includes Dutch farms that operated in developing countries such as Kenya as well. 
7 According to Gebreeyesus and Iizuka (2012), Golden Rose was a subsidiary of RINA investment based in UK 
(Indian-British family), which had broader investment experience in African countries before its arrival to Ethiopia. 
Although its initial entry to Ethiopia was for another business bid, the failure of its original plan led to exploration of 
other opportunities in the country. The firm was convinced by its consultant to invest in rose production. The 
experience of the two Ethiopian pioneers provided input for the feasibility study of the firm. Golden Rose is no 
longer operating in the industry, but it made a huge investment in learning that benefited later firms.   
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to Germany. The success of Golden Rose attracted new entrants: three locally-owned firms 
(Enyi, SIET and Summit) and one joint venture firm (Ethio-Dream). The owners of Golden 
Rose were open to share their experience, materials and even its skilled workers with newcomer 
firms. As a result, the early entrants were able to learn production and marketing techniques, 
such as hiring expatriates, importing appropriate equipment, selecting the right varieties and 
sourcing them from international breeders and choosing market outlets (Gebereeyesus and 
Iizuka 2012).  The new firms appeared to imitate the market channel of Golden Rose, according 
to the World Bank (2004). By 2004, most of these new locally owned firms exported the largest 
share of their products to Germany via direct sales.  
In 2002, the Ethiopian Horticulture Producer and Exporter Association (EHPEA) was formed 
by five fruit and vegetable producers (including Ethio-flora PLC) with the support of DFID, the 
UK development agency. Its members expanded to 20 by 2004, including the above-mentioned 
cut-flower firms. In the meantime, the Ethiopian government began implementing its 
Agriculture Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) development policy. Within the 
framework of ADLI, the government adopted an export-oriented development strategy that 
promoted selected sectors through various investment incentives. Floriculture was initially not 
among the selected sectors but was later included after the established flower firms lobbied for 
its selection using their Association. The leader of the Association (the owner of Ethio-flora 
PLC) played a crucial role in convincing the government to select floriculture as one of the 
priority export sectors, and hence he participated in designing the action plan for floriculture - 
the five-year development plan (Gebereeyesus and Iizuka 2012).  
In 2004, with the support of the government, some members of EHPEA (both local and foreign-
owned firms) created a company called Ethio-Horti Share with the purpose of engaging in the 
collective importation of inputs and air cargo booking, in order to increase the supply of inputs 
for the sector and to lower costs of transport. Through this company, all growers were able to 
import inputs collectively and rent a cargo plane from Ethiopian airline (Melese and Helmsing 
2010).8
Starting from 2003, the government provided financial and non-financial incentive packages to 
encourage expansion of the floriculture industry. The government also made land available in 
water abundant areas within proximity to Bole international airport. The land was provided to 
investors for long term lease at a very low price, around $10 per square meter/annually 
compared to $30-40 in Kenya (Oqubay 2015). The Development Bank of Ethiopia, a state-
8 However, in 2012, the national Ethiopian airlines cut out middlemen in cargo handling services, such as Ethio-Horti 
Share Company and others, and began providing the service in monopoly.    
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owned bank, provided soft loans that financed 70% of the cost of the project only pledging the 
project itself without additional collateral, at a very low-interest rate compared to neighboring 
countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.  Moreover, the incentives also included a five-
year income tax holiday, loss rescheduling provisions and removal of tariffs and duties on 
capital goods. There was also a less discussed role played by the government such as easing 
regulations on the import of pesticides and fertilizers (Taylor 2011).  
The incentives attracted a large number of domestic and foreign investors, who mainly came 
from the Netherlands, India and Israel. Between 2004 and 2005, the number of flower farms 
increased from 9 to 30, cultivating a total 150 hectares of land. In 2007, the number of firms 
reached 86 and the cultivated area grew more than fivefold, from 150 to 801.6 hectares (Melese 
and Helmsing 2010). The incentive package even attracted the largest rose farms in the world 
from Kenya to Ethiopia. The firm is called Sher Ethiopia; it began operation in 2006 on 
approximately 500 hectares of land in Ziway. The firm played an important role in the 
expansion of the industry through its turnkey project in which it built flower farms with all the 
requisite infrastructure in place and sold them on a hire-purchase basis. Investors could rent 
‘ready to operate’ greenhouses with an opportunity to become an owner within eight to nine 
years. This model lowered the entry barriers for new firms. As a result, it attracted four local 
investors (including Meskel Flower, the pioneer9) and five Dutch investors. Moreover, Sher 
Ethiopia participated in multiple parts of the floriculture global value chain, which facilitated 
the further development of the sector in Ethiopia. For example, in 2006, it began importing and 
distributing inputs required by the growing industry, which also broke the monopoly held by the 
Ethio-Horti share company. In addition, Sher provided logistics, transport and agent services in 
the Netherlands, as well as locally via Flower Port Cargo PLC (Melese and Helmsing 2010; 
Taylor 2011). 
9 Meskel Flower collapsed in 2001 following the arrest of the owner but upon his release in 2005 the owner 
established a new farm with the same name by renting a turnkey of Sher Ethiopia.  
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Table 1.  Growth of Ethiopian flower industry 




Export value in 
millions (USD) 
Employment 
2003/4 9 5 
2004/5 30 150 13 21,300 
2005/06 345 23 
2006/07 86 802 64 
2007/8 922 112 25,816 
2008/9 1,240 131 34,720 
2009/10 1,306 170 36,568 
2010/11 1,300 175 36,400 
2011/12 80 1,299 198 40,387 
2012/13 187 
2013/14 84 1,426 200 
2014/15 87 1,623 221 ≈50,000 
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the National Bank of Ethiopia, Development Bank of 
Ethiopia, Ethiopian customs authority, Ethiopian horticulture development agency, Ethiopian horticulture 
producer and exporter association, and Oqubay (2015).  
The boom that started around 2004/5 was not only due to the national government incentives 
but also to development cooperation, particularly by the Dutch government, which had a keen 
interest in the global floriculture industry and saw Ethiopia’s potential as a new production site. 
As of 2003, the embassy of the Netherlands in Addis Ababa organized several trade missions 
and provided a subsidy under a program in emerging markets called PSOM (now known as the 
Dutch Good Growth Fund).10 This program provided a grant to Dutch investors that covered up 
to 60% of the project costs, with the condition that Dutch investors had to enter a joint-venture 
with a local partner from Ethiopia (Melese and Helmsing 2010).  
However, the author’s previous fieldwork in the industry indicates that the rush to invest in 
floriculture was not driven entirely by genuine interests, but also by a desire to take advantage 
of the cheap access to finance and land provided by the government’s incentive package. Some 
investors diverted the funds for other purposes while holding a large tract of land 
unproductively, and other investors left the country with the money. Taylor (2011) reports 
similar kinds of misuse of finance in the industry.  
10 For more information on the Dutch Good Growth Fund, see http://english.dggf.nl/. 
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The Dutch auction opened an import office in Ethiopia and expanded its client base quickly as 
the auction became the major market channel for Ethiopian flowers by 2006, capturing 67% of 
exported flowers.  The Dutch auction plays the most influential role in the global value chain; 
however, as mentioned earlier, the direct sale channel has grown rapidly since the 1990s in 
European and other markets.  
Reaching maturity and building capabilities 
The inflow of more foreign direct investment created a critical mass in the Ethiopian industry. 
Local firms acquired the main production capabilities through foreign consultants and acquired 
some investment capabilities through imitation, but they did not actively cooperate with foreign 
firms in a way that could have allowed direct learning (Melese and Helmsing 2010:55). 
Therefore, they did not initially acquire enough capabilities to remain competitive in the 
industry and thus many struggled to survive when there was a crisis in the industry.  
The rapid take-off of the floriculture industry in Ethiopia that began around 2005 demanded a 
matching learning pace in the country overall. Multiple actors such as private investors, the 
national government and international governments played a role in building the national and 
sectoral capabilities that were needed for the industry to develop. The Ethiopian Horticulture 
Producer and Exporters Association (EHPEA), whose members reached over 60, became a 
focal point for partnerships and to coordinate with state and non-state actors supporting the 
industry. Local and foreign firms were able to cooperate through the association for the 
purposes of collective action around non-core activities, such as importing inputs and lobbying 
government, even though they had not engaged in cooperation around core activities, such as 
sharing knowledge and collective marketing. 
The government facilitated investment with a ‘one-stop shop’ service at the Ethiopian 
investment agency and set up the Ethiopian Horticulture Development Agency (EHDA) in 
2008, creating a lead agency to take over the responsibilities of the horticulture development 
team that was operating under the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The EHDA worked closely 
with the cut-flower firms, through their industry association, to resolve problems related to 
resource and service mobilization such as electricity power, telecom, land and foreign exchange. 
In relation to air transportation, Ethiopian Airlines, which was granted a monopoly in the cargo 
transportation of flowers, expanded its logistics and transport capacity to meet the demand of 
the sector. 
The industry association, apart from representing its members nationally and internationally, 
initiated and implemented projects (individually and/or jointly with others), lobbied 
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government, organized events (like global flower expo), provided market information, 
facilitated new entrants and provided training. One of the main achievements of EHPEA was 
the development of a sector-specific code of practice (CoP-Bronze, Silver and Gold levels) in 
collaboration with the Netherlands and the EHDA. This code of practice helped the industry to 
catch up with international standards, which acted as governance mechanisms in the global 
value chain. There are several certification schemes in the global floriculture sector geared 
towards addressing environmental and social concerns. The MPS-ABC and GLOBA-GAP, 
which are business-to-business standards, are the most widely adopted in the global floriculture 
industry. In 2015, the Sliver level of the Ethiopian code of practices was benchmarked to 
GLOBAL-GAP. The primary concern of these business-to-business standards is good 
agricultural practice and environmental protection. However, MPS later incorporated social 
issues, resulting in the MPS-SQ (socially qualified). The other international standards include 
consumer labels, such as Fair Flowers Fair plants, Flower Label Program, Fairtrade Labelling 
Organization, and Ethical trade initiatives. Most of these standards cover more (sometimes 
exclusively) social issues rather than business-to-business standards, while also addressing 
environmental concerns. In 2010, 28 firms in the Ethiopian industry adopted one or more of 
these international standards, but MPS was by far the most dominant (Gebreeyesus 2014).  
The Ethiopian floriculture industry continued receiving considerable support from international 
donors and development cooperation at different phases of its development, but the most 
prominent support came from the Dutch government and its support was broadly linked to 
building institutions that were core to the industry. For instance, the PSOM program supported 
firms to set up a logistics company for perishables and a laboratory for soil analysis. In addition, 
the Ethiopia-Netherlands Horticulture partnership, a public-private partnership, was created in 
2006 to support the development of the industry through an extensive capacity building 
program that included the creation of the Ethiopian codes of practice (mentioned above), a 
phytosanitary unit, an integrated pest management system, and a decision support system for 
selecting new production areas. 11 In addition, the program supported the establishment of a 
training unit under EHPEA and sector specific trainings were carried out in collaboration with 
higher education institutions such as Jimma University, one of the oldest agriculture colleges in 
Ethiopia. As a result, the program played an important role in creating trained labour for the 
sector. Finally, based on demand from the industry association, the Center for the Promotion of 
11 Some of the results of the Ethiopia-Netherlands Horticulture partnership program are presented in a Dutch 
government evaluation report of 2009, available at 
 https://www.government.nl/documents/reports/2009/03/01/review-of-the-wssd-public-private-partnership-program-
in-ethiopia 
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Imports from Developing Countries (CBI)12 organized trainings on specific topics targeting 
local firms as well as foreign firms with investors from developing countries such as local and 
Indian firms. CBI’s training program was upgraded and started in 2009 to include a master level 
class given to firms that appeared committed to stay in the industry. 
Surviving the tide and repositioning in the floriculture global value chain 
The global financial crisis led to a considerable drop in demand and prices for cut-flowers, 
especially between 2007 and 2009, significantly affecting the global floriculture trade (Taylor 
2011). Flowers are a luxury product, and thus they tend to be sensitive to changes in disposable 
income. Growth in global floriculture trade continued to be unstable after 2009 and the large 
drop in flower consumption had not fully recovered by 2016 (Rabobank 2016). In some end-
markets, consumers switched to low-value products, such as short stem and small head size 
roses known as sweethearts, which benefited the unspecialized segment of the global market 
such as supermarkets and Do It Yourself stores (Ibid). Firms that produced intermediate and 
high-quality flowers for specialized segments such as florists were adversely affected by the 
global financial crisis.  
Despite considerable development in their technological capabilities, many local firms were not 
able to withstand the global financial crisis. As a consequence, foreign firms became more 
dominant in the Ethiopia floriculture industry, as shown in Table 2 illustrating the trend in 
number and ownership of firms in the sector. Between the period 2007 to 2011, a large number 
of firms, especially the locally owned firms, collapsed or their management was taken over 
temporarily by the Ethiopian Development Bank (the lender). However, the Ethiopian 
Development Bank itself needed to learn, as it had limited knowledge about the floriculture 
sector, so it was not unusual to find some collapsed farms being guarded by the Bank’s security 
personnel and waiting for a new buyer to come. Nevertheless, the Bank considered the 
industry’s challenge with the global financial crisis; it revised loan repayments and provided a 
grace period to the firms. But the crisis did not stop the Ethiopian floriculture from growing in 
export value and volume, although it grew at a lower rate compared to the rate between 2005 




                                                            
12 CBI was established in 1971 and is part of the Dutch enterprise agency funded by the Dutch ministry of foreign 
affairs. 
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Table 2:  Number of flower firms by ownership13 
 Ownership Number of flower farms 
 2005/6 2006/7 2008 2012 2013 June 2016 
Ethiopian 21 38 23 19 12 15 
Joint 8 9 15 7 12 1 
foreign 13 26 26 43 30 66 
unknown 7 13 3  8  
total 49 86 67 69 62 82 
Source: Melese and Helmsing (2010); Gebreeyesus and Iizuka (2012); Oqubay (2015); EHPEA website: 
http://www.ehpea.org, last accessed December 2016. 
 
During preliminary research in 2016, ahead of the local firm survey, I confirmed that there were 
a total of 82 flower firms operational in the country, of which 61 were rose growing firms, 15 
summer flowers and the remaining 6 produced cuttings.14 Some of these firms produce other 
horticulture products for export, in addition to flowers, such as fruits, vegetables and herbs. 
According to EHDA, in 2015 the total cultivated land reached 1.623 hectares, and 66 firms 
exported 50.4 million kilograms of flowers and generated US$ 221 million foreign exchange. 
This export value positions Ethiopia as the fifth biggest exporter, marginally trailing behind 
Ecuador (see Figure 1). According to Rabobank (2016), in the last decade, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Colombia and Ecuador have taken global market share from the Netherlands, and in 2015 for 






                                                            
13 The number of farms can be over or understated, and proper identification of ownership is a difficult task, as the 
available database from EHDA does not seem to be updated when changes occur in ownership. Moreover, sometimes 
a single firm might be reported with different names, such as by the owner’s name as well as by the firm’s name.  
Although considerable effort has been made to solve this problem through triangulation of different sources, one 
should not be surprised to find reports with slightly different total number of firms and ownership structures.   
14 Cuttings include planting materials for cut-flowers such as roses and summer flowers. Cuttings are controlled by a 
handful of European multinational companies engaged in breeding and propagating. Some of these companies set up 
fully owned and controlled subsidiaries in developing countries or set up joint ventures with ‘captive’ partners (Evers 
et al. 2014). Engaging in the production of cuttings requires higher technological capabilities than cut-flowers, as it 
needs dedicated research and development, and higher knowledge, as well as licences to propagate. 
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 Figure 1:  Largest cut-flower export countries of the world in 2005 and 2015 
 
Source: Rabobank (2016). 
Note: The Netherlands share typically includes re-exports. 
 
The Netherlands remained the main destination of Ethiopian flowers. In 2015, around 84% of 
Ethiopian flower exports was to the Netherlands, followed by Saudi Arabia (5%), Norway 
(2.3%), United Arab Emirates (1.59%) and Germany (1.32%). Similarly, the Dutch auction was 
the dominant export channel for Ethiopian flowers, but the direct sales channel was increasing. 
Although the two market channels are often discussed as separate and independent from each 
other, this seems to be slowly changing in the contemporary global value chain of floriculture, 
thanks to online trading (e-trading). As explained below, the emergence of online trading is 
blurring the line between the auction and direct sales channels. One can find the two channels 
playing complementary roles and cooperating in areas where one expects them to be competing. 
The auction appears to be acknowledging the inevitable change and hence leading as well as 
adjusting for the newly emerging e-trading system. Such adjustments to change or innovation 
are not new to the Dutch auction. For example, in response to the rise of direct sales channels, 
the auction began a system that can facilitate direct buying and selling, the so-called auction-
direct or Floraholland-Connect, with an effective logistics system. Moreover, as the e-traders 
explained, by introducing an electronic remote buying system (KOA) in the 1990s, the auction 
laid the foundation for online trading. 
Similarly, one of the most important market channels for some local firms in the Ethiopian 
floriculture industry cannot be described as auction or direct sales, but rather it is a little bit of 
both. The buyer’s office is physically located in one of FloraHolland’s auction houses, and it 
CAE WORKING PAPER 2017: 2                                                                                                                                 15 
 
plays various roles in different parts of the global value chain as a consolidator, importer, 
exporter and so on. Its newest business is e-trading with supplier firms from developing 
countries, mainly from Ethiopia and Kenya. The buyer (e-trader, hereafter) claims to have a 
strong capability to predict a daily auction price so that it can offer in advance a slightly higher 
price to suppliers (for instance, Ethiopian-owned firms) that are connected with it via its online 
platform. The supplier decides to permit the e-trader to start selling part of its daily shipment via 
its web shop before it is even shipped to Europe. If the e-trader was unable to sell the entire 
agreed amount by the time the shipment arrives, the unsold flowers go directly to the auction, 
and the e-trader pays for the sold amount via the auction payment system. Although the e-trader 
is directly competing with the auction, it is doing so with the cooperation of the auction by 
sharing one of its most important competitive advantage, a fast and guaranteed payment system, 
which is a highly valued service in the eyes of supplier firms. 
Notwithstanding its growing importance, in this study, the e-trading marketing channel is 
treated the same as the auction channel because the two channels have similar requirements and 
the e-trader is capitalizing on the auction system to shift to online direct sales. However, 
according to interviews with the e-traders, this might change soon.  Similar views have 
circulated on some prominent online magazines that focus on the industry, questioning the 
relevance of the auction in the context of online trading and introducing a new business (a 
guaranteed payment system) that would enable buyers and suppliers to move forward with e-
trading.15      
Similarly, the direct sales channel in the floriculture global value chain is predominantly 
conceptualized from the perspective of supermarkets in Western countries (Riisgaard and 
Hammer 2008; Gebreeyesus and Sonobe 2009; Taylor 2011; Evers et al. 2014). However, there 
are types of buyers other than supermarkets that are growing in importance for smaller supplier 
firms that largely produce for specialized market segments, and also new end-markets. The 
contemporary floriculture global value chain is characterized increasingly by the emergence of 
new demand in the global South and alternative outlets for producers in developing countries. 
For instance, Saudi Arabia is the second largest destination of Ethiopian flowers. In addition, 
traditional wholesalers are increasingly leaving the auction to engage in the direct sales channel. 
These wholesalers are typically the supplier of specialized retailers such as florists, gardening 
centers, street markets and web-shops, which are dominant flower outlets in Europe with a 
market share of approximately 66% (CBI 2015). 
                                                            
15 See, http://www.floraldaily.com/article/7543/NL-Trading-can-be-done-online,-why-still-auction, 
written by René Fransen, Ai2. Publication date: 11/18/2016  
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Locally owned firms in Ethiopia’s floriculture export industry 
When I carried out the local firm survey in June 2016, there were 15 Ethiopian-owned firms and 
one joint venture between Ethiopian and Dutch partners. The joint venture was established with 
the support of a subsidy under the Dutch Good Growth Fund. This firm is not considered 
locally-owned because although the Ethiopian partner owns 25% of the company, he has no 
meaningful involvement in the business. Among the 15 Ethiopian-owned firms, four types of 
Ethiopian ownership could be identified. Five firms are owned by indigenous Ethiopians and 
are part of a family business, which could be considered a diversified business group, given that 
the family had firms in various other sectors of the economy. Another five firms are owned by 
Ethiopian diaspora who had foreign citizenship and lived abroad for a long period before they 
returned to Ethiopia. These diaspora investors run one or more businesses alongside floriculture, 
and some set up their floriculture firm under an existing umbrella of their family business. Two 
firms are owned by political parties of the ruling coalition, under the Tigray endowment fund 
and the Amhara endowment fund.  
Of the remaining three locally owned firms, two firms are owned by Mohammed Hussein 
Ali Al-'Amoudi16, an Ethiopian-Saudi billionaire with a business empire in Ethiopia, and one 
firm is owned by his brothers. However, only one of Al-Amoudi’s firms is included in the local 
firm survey, because it only became clear at a later stage in carrying out the survey that there 
were 3 firms linked to Al-Moudi, and not just one. Most of the available databases identified the 
two Al-Moudi firms under a single name, and the firm owned by his brothers’ firm was listed as 
having foreign ownership.17  My attempts to schedule interviews with the additional two firms 
were not successful. Although some general information about these firms and their position in 
the market was collected through interviews with experts and end-market actors, the data is not 
sufficient to include the two firms in the full analysis of local firms’ technological capabilities 
in this paper.  
The 13 firms included in the local firm survey are listed in Table 3. The firms are anonymized 
and thus listed as Firm A-Rose, B-Rose and so on. These 13 local firms are rose growing firms 
that have been operating in the industry for five to 13 years and on average have 45 hectares of 
16  In table 3 ownership of Al-Amoudi’s firm is mentioned as diaspora for the sake of anonymity. 
17 This firm (owned by Al-Amoudi’s brother) was once reported as a joint venture and later changed to foreign. This 
might be correct as the official nationality of firm owners can be foreign. However, unlike Al-Amoudi’s firm, his 
brothers’ firm was not identified as a local firm during triangulation with key informants. 
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land. As of June 2016, on average, each firm cultivated 19 hectares of land with 12 rose 
varieties and hired 464 workers.18   
The flower farms typically appear in clusters and are located at various altitudes ranging from 
1600 meters to 2500 meters above sea level. The clusters are commonly named after the closest 
town, such as Ziway, Debrezeit, Sebeta, Holeta, Koka and Bair Dar. As indicated in Table 3, 
most of the Ethiopian-owned firms are located in the Debrezeit cluster (5 firms) and the Sebeta 
cluster (5 firms) but some firms are located in the Holeta, Bahir Dar and Awash clusters. Over 
60% of their products are intermediate roses (50-60 cm length), followed by T-hybrid (60-80 
cm) and sweetheart roses (30-40 cm), which make up the smallest share.
Although the clusters are located at slightly different altitudes, ranging from 1800 meters to 
2500 meters, it is only the altitude of Holeta that makes a significant difference in product 
characteristics. For instance, firms in Debrezeit and Holeta can grow roses with similar stem 
length but with a significant difference in head size since the roses grow slowly in Holeta, 
resulting in a heavy stem and a larger head size. Generally, such roses fetch a higher value in 
the market but yield fewer stems per hectare compared to roses grown in the other clusters. In 
subsequent discussions, this unique characteristic of Holeta is considered. 
18 Some firms almost completely utilized their land holding, while other firms had land of considerable size that 
was not cultivated. 
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Table 3:  Overview of Ethiopian-owned Floriculture Firms19 
                                                            
19 Firms usually report their export via the Dutch auction and e-trader as one but sometimes they gave separate 
estimate about the average share that is traded via the auction and sold by the e-trader. In that case, it is accordingly 
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Part II: Technological capabilities of Ethiopian-owned Flower Firms 
In the second part of the paper, the capabilities and competitiveness of these eleven Ethiopian-
owned firms are measured and analyzed. It explains the methodology used to construct and 
measure capabilities. The technological capability approach was combined with the global value 
chains approach to develop a capability matrix that identifies the core capabilities required to 
enter and operate in the floriculture global value chain. This matrix guided the design of the 
local firm survey, which includes questions to capture data on core capabilities that are used as 
indicators. The survey data on each indicator was assessed to create sum scores on each 
capability category, as well as an aggregate capability score. This part of the paper maps the 
individual and aggregate capabilities of the Ethiopian-owned firms and then compares the 
aggregate capability scores to a series of competitiveness measures. The comparative analysis 
reveals the dynamics and complexity between capabilities and competitiveness. The concluding 
section discusses three export trajectories identified among the local firms based on their end-
markets and market channels.   
Technological capabilities required in floriculture global value chain 
The horizontal axis of the floriculture GVC technological capabilities matrix in Table 4 
describes the categories of capabilities required in the industry: investment, product, production, 
harvest and post-harvest processes; logistics, finance and services linkages; input supply chain 
linkages; and end market linkages. Entering production of cut-flowers for export requires a 
large investment capacity to set up production facilities and source inputs as well as to hire and 
train workers. Along with finance, firms need access to cool-chain logistics from farm to 
airport, cargo booking and handling services.  
The complexity of each category of capabilities increases depending on the targeted end-market 
and the market channels, as indicated on the vertical axis of Table 4. The literature on the 
floriculture global value chain generally considers the direct sales marketing channel to the 
European Union to require greater capabilities than the Dutch auction marketing channel. 
However, firms selling mainly via the Dutch auction may diversify or adjust their product, 
process and marketing strategies, which require new capabilities, rather than moving into direct 
sales to the European Union. Selling to the Middle East is considered to require a lower level of 
capabilities than the Dutch auction marketing channel and is the easiest end-market for firms to 
access. Thus, four rows are included in the Ethiopia floriculture matrix: basic production 
capacity, Dutch auction, strategic diversification and direct sales to European Union markets.  
CAE WORKING PAPER 2017: 2                                                                                                                                 20 
 
To sell via the Dutch auction firms need to meet stringent minimum requirements related to 
plant health, quality sorting, grading and packing that necessitate extending their capabilities 
beyond the basic production capacity capabilities described in the first row. However, to 
strengthen their competitiveness and prices received in the auction channel, firms need to 
deepen their basic production capacity capabilities: expanding varieties, upgrade greenhouse 
technologies, regularly train workers and improve product quality (stem length, head size, 
colour), production, harvest and post-harvest processes as well as improve data recording and 
management information systems. At the same time, firms could improve and control cool 
chain and logistics to prevent/minimize quality deterioration until the products reach the end-
market.  They can also increase their market knowledge and ability to exploit services provided 
by the auction by collecting information on buyers as well as working on feedback from buyers 
or unpacking agents at the auction regarding their quality and reliability. In turn, the firms can 
engage in direct marketing or ‘auction-direct’, which is a kind of direct sales but facilitated by 
the auction itself. Although certification is not required by the auction, it is important to take on 
sustainability standards (business-to-business and/or consumer labels) that are most commonly 
adopted by competitors, such as MPS-ABC, GLOBALGAP and Fair Flower and Fair Plants. 
Furthermore, firms build relations with breeders in order to get exclusive varieties, which are 
important for meeting the requirements of the dominant auction buyers (such as florists) that 
have a higher demand for exclusive varieties and high value/quality products.  
Firms selling to Europe primarily via the direct sales channel, especially to supermarkets, need 
to have greater capabilities to ensure consistency, reliability and flexibility in terms of meeting 
buyers’ specifications.  Deepening capabilities in direct sales channels involves vertically 
integrated chain operations, especially in logistics and marketing, as well as adding more value 
to products such as delivering ready-to-use bouquets. However, there seems to be no guarantee 
that the additional capabilities required in this channel will be compensated with a higher price. 
In addition, the price is generally volatile in both auction and direct sales channels due to 
instability in global demand, which is a broader challenge of the floriculture global value chain. 
Weighing risk and reward, firms could stick to the auction channel instead of going to direct 
sales, adopting a strategy of deepening their capabilities in the auction channel in order to 
increase their chance of fetching a higher price there. Thus, selling via direct sales might require 
higher capabilities than selling via auction, but using the auction channel is not necessarily an 
indicator of a lower level of capabilities.  
As indicated earlier, firms might target multiple end-markets and market-channels as strategic 
diversification, which relates to diversifying end-markets or products. Firms might enhance 
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their bargaining position vis-à-vis their European buyers if they have alternative markets. Firms 
might also make more profit if they sell to other end-markets where the marketing and transport 
costs are lower. Marketing costs could be lower where buyers do not have high requirements 
and demand compliance through certifications. For these reasons, a competitive net price could 
be achieved in end-markets outside of Europe. This also holds for the so-called ‘lower value’ 
end markets such as regional and domestic supermarket chains, where producers who have 
export experience to the European market tend to benefit more than their competitors as they 
already possess capabilities to meet requirements that are just emerging or yet to emerge in the 
lower value end markets (Barrientos et al 2015). Diversifying end markets can be also pursued 
as a strategy of ‘stabilization’ when firms face a crisis in meeting the demand in their original 
market such as Europe (Whitfield 2016). The contemporary floriculture global value chain is 
characterized not only by stiff competition but also by the emergence of new demands and 
south-to-south trade. Thus, diversification can be seen as a strategic move in relation to getting 
a ‘better deal’, which can be part of a learning process in building technological capabilities.  
In any case, in order to build such important capabilities, firms need to link up with various 
private and public institutions that render general as well as sector specific supports. For 
example, collective action among firms through an industry association can help to improve the 
overall position of the industry, as well as individual firms, by addressing industry-wide 
constraints. By linking with the government sectoral agency, firms can access sector-specific 
support such as foreign experts and trained labor, as well as get the government to improve the 
implementation of general services such as power supply, roads and telecommunications for the 
sector.  Linkages between firms and the government sectoral agency, whether formal or 
informal, can also serve as a platform for discussing challenges facing the industry and possible 
solutions.
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Table 4:   
Floriculture GVC technological capabilities matrix 
Investment Product and Production process Linkages 




Input supply chain End market 
Basic production 
capacity 
Selection of varieties,  
Choosing location & 
type of greenhouse 
and other equipment; 
construction of service 
blocks (pack house, 
stores) 
Meet minimum 
quality req. of targeted 
market (e.g. Middle 
East) 
Basic farm management 
system and data recording; 
hire and train managers & 
workers; meet Bronze-level 
requirements 
Cutting at the right 
stage, at right length, at 
right position; transport 
to pack house; 
Defoliating, grading, 
bunching, trimming; 
packing; quality control  
Cool chain on farm 
Access to cool chain 
from farm to airport; 
access to cargo 
booking and handling 
services; access to 
finance; 
Source varieties from 
breeders  
Source quality packing 
materials; chemicals and 
fertilizers 
Find buyer; negotiate; 
build relation 
Dutch Auction Expand land holding 
(req’d to expand 
varieties); upgrade 
greenhouse 
technology; cool chain 
on farm; inventory 
and storage system; 
Conducive and safe 
working environment 
Increase number of 
high value varieties,  
Increased 
certifications/labels & 
use for product 
differentiation, 





process to improve 
efficiency & increase yields 
of products that meet 
specifications (stem length, 
head size), as well as re-
evaluate/change production 
strategy; Increase training of 
staff; communicate HR 
policy;  
Basic agric R&D. 
Monitoring and 
improving all processes 
Improve cool chain 
management; 
Increase reliability and 
consistency in 
delivery;  
Create own logistics 
company, or in 
collaboration with 
other firms 
Access to sector 
specific and other 
services  
Relations with international 
consultants, breeders, other 
firms to discuss farm 
activities and gain 
knowledge; 
Collaborating in collective 
schemes to buy inputs, 
arrange transport logistics 
and handling; 
Vertical integration of 





information at acceptable 
level of accuracy; 
appear regularly on the 
auction clock; 
Appear on all auction days  
consistently score high in 
grading and reliability 
index 
Relation with auction 
service to improve grading 
score and reliability index 









(fruits, veg, etc) 
Farm management systems 
and staff training to deal with 
diverse production processes 
of new products. 
New end markets: global 
(e.g. Japan), regional and 
domestic. Finding buyers 
and building relations; 
multiple marketing 
strategies 
Direct Sales Expansion—higher 
volumes req’d 






B2B and consumer 
Labels/certifications req’d; 
Integrated cool chain 
management; just-in-
time delivery 
Own marketing & 
distribution centers 
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Measuring the Technological Capabilities of Floriculture Firms 
The floriculture technological capabilities matrix guided the construction of the local firm survey 
questionnaire (see Annex 1).  The survey questions captured a firm’s performance across the 
categories of capabilities, and their depth within each category in relation to marketing channel and 
strategic diversification.20  The questionnaire included both quantitative indicators and qualitative 
measures, including open-ended questions. Although the questions were largely aimed to examine the 
current conditions of the firms at the moment of the survey, firms were asked about their past 
situations related to initial experience and investment capabilities. The questionnaire was relatively 
long, but not all questions were relevant for all firms.  If the interviewee was pressed for time, the 
questionnaire indicated the ‘must ask’ questions in bold, which were asked in all instances in order to 
have a minimum base of comparable data.  
The questionnaire was administered to the following flower firms: ZK flower, Dugda flower, Yassien 
(Sunrise) flower, Enyi flower, Tinaw flower, ET-Highland flower, Tanaflora, Minaye flower, Super-
arsity flower, Ethio-agri-ceft flower, Selam flower, Rainbow flower and Saron flower. In most cases, 
the owners were interviewed (seven of the 13 firms), and in the absence of the owner, the top 
managers (general managers and sometimes farm managers) were interviewed. Occasionally both 
owners and managers were interviewed in order to capture information for all sections of the 
questionnaire. For half of the firms, the interview was conducted at the farm site, while for the rest it 
was done at their head office in Addis Ababa.  The firm names are anonymized in the rest of the paper 
in order to respect firms’ preference for anonymity when publishing the results of the study. 
Based on the survey results, the indicators in the capabilities matrix were reformulated into four 
categories of capabilities for the purposes of qualitative assessment, which involved selecting key 
indicators of each capability category.  The four categories are product and production process, input 
integration, linkages and end-market. Product and process capabilities were consolidated into one 
category because the indicators for product and production processes are interrelated. The linkage 
capabilities are kept as three separate categories that are the same as the matrix in Table 4: input 
integration, linkages (to service providers, national institutions, industry association and other firms in 
the industry) and end-market. In the reformulation, it is intended to emphasize end-market, as it is not 
only a capability category but also a strong determinant of functional complexity (on the vertical axis). 
In addition, it was found that the ability of local firms to propagate plants in-house and to import 
inputs directly for themselves was important in the Ethiopian national context, and thus input 
integration is kept as a separate category.  
20 The order of the questions in the questionnaire in Annex 1 do not directly correspond to the matrix, as they had 
to be ordered in a way that made sense for an interview. 
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The investment capability category was not included in the assessment exercise for two reasons. First, 
the investment category is partly concerned with past capabilities such as initial experience, search 
effort as well as the investment capacity of firms. The survey result showed that firms were largely at a 
similar level of experience and investment capacity initially (at the time of investment), so firms 
would have the same score in this category. Therefore, investment capabilities are not included in the 
scoring table, but the survey results related to investment capabilities are discussed in the qualitative 
analysis. Another reason not to include investment capabilities separately in the scoring is that, the 
current investment capabilities of firms (at the time of the survey) is implicitly measured in all other 
indicators as it is an on-going process embedded in and manifested by the other four categories.  
Several questions were selected from the survey questionnaire as indicators for each of the four 
capability categories. The selected questions, and thus indicators, include both quantitative and 
qualitative questions. In other words, questions where the answer was a number, and questions that 
were open-ended. In this way, indicators are not biased towards what can be counted. For open-ended 
questions, the firm is scored based on a subjective assessment of the firm’s performance using the 
answers provided by the interviewee. Where possible, the direct response of the interviewee is used 
but crosschecked with other responses in the questionnaire to confirm the validity. The exact method 
of scoring is explained below in the context of each indicator included in the scoring table.  
Five indicators were selected to measure the product and production process capabilities of firms: (1) 
number of varieties, (2) number of export days per week, (3) internal reject rate, (4) average labor 
turnover rate and (5) certification. Number of varieties is assumed to indicate a firm’s ability to handle 
more varieties, which requires specific knowledge about how to produce each variety. It also indicates 
a firm’s potential to reach different market channels, as some literature shows a correlation between 
the number of varieties and participation in the direct sales marketing channel (Gebreeyesus and 
Sonobe 2009). However, it is not clear how large the numbers of varieties should be for firms to 
participate in direct sales. Moreover, the study by Gebreeyesus and Sonobe (2009) refers only to direct 
sales to European supermarkets; there are other European and non-European buyers who use the direct 
sales channel and who might have different requirements than supermarkets. 
 In relation to the number of export days per week, exporting for more days indicates a higher capacity 
of firms in shipment planning and forwarding to end-markets. Additionally, it shows greater market 
presence, which is important in finding new buyers and establishing a position in a market. The third 
indicator is average internal reject rate. The lower the internal reject rate is the better the firm’s ability 
in maximizing efficiency or profit is. Moreover, it can also imply a stronger production process that 
can generate export standard products with fewer rejects. For scoring, the overall experience of the 
industry is considered. An industry expert confirmed that the average internal reject of the Ethiopian 
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industry is five percent; given that the industry is dominated by foreign firms, including the Dutch-
owned firms, the Ethiopian industry standard roughly reflects the international standard.   
The fourth indicator of product and production process capabilities is the firm’s rate of labor turnover. 
A lower turnover rate indicates a firm’s ability in increasing efficiency and productivity, as labor 
would be stable enough to master and adapt the work.  The final indicator is certification schemes 
firms adopted.  Certification indicates product and production processes that meet an international 
business standard, as well as a firm’s ability in producing a differentiated product with a broader 
potential to cater to various market segments or niche markets. The score is given depending on the 
types of certificates firms adopted. 
Input integration refers to a firm’s capability to source inputs measured using two indicators: 
importing fertilizers and chemicals internally and in-house plant propagation. These indicators were 
selected because of their relevance in the global industry as well as the conditions in the Ethiopian 
national context. Local firms reported that it was cheaper and safer in terms of quality and availability 
if they could import inputs (fertilizers and chemicals) directly and propagate plants internally, rather 
than buy these inputs from local importing firms and propagation firms. Neither of the key inputs 
(fertilizers and chemicals) are produced locally, yet. Thus, if a firm is capable of importing directly a 
large share of its inputs rather than buying from an independent importer, and if it can operate in-
house propagation of plants instead of buying from propagators in the domestic market, it indicates a 
firm’s stronger financial, logistical as well as technical capabilities in supply chain management. 
Three indicators were selected to measure the linkage capabilities of local firms because the industry 
association in Ethiopia focuses mostly on general services that are relevant and can be made available 
for all members alongside lobbying government and many inter-firm linkages, especially knowledge 
sharing, which take place outside the formal institutions of the industry association. Therefore, in 
addition to participation in an industry association and linkages with national institutions, firms were 
asked directly about their linkages with other firms. Two sets of questions combined with a subjective 
assessment were used in scoring each indicator. The first indicator is a firm’s linkage with other firms 
in the industry: here firms were asked to rate their participation in any kinds of collaborative schemes 
(formal or informal) with other firms as limited, medium or high. Then they were asked to list the 
activities or schemes in which they participated. Based on the listed activities, I made a subjective 
assessment to give the final score. For instance, visiting other firms was considered a lower 
cooperation than jointly hiring consultants with other firms. The second indicator is a firm’s linkage 
with the industry association. Firms were asked to rate their participation in the industry association as 
limited, medium or high, and then asked to list the activities and services in which they participated. 
Based on the activities listed, I made a subjective assessment to give the final score.   The last 
indicator is a firm’s linkage with sector specific and research institutions. Here also the same three 
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steps applied to do the final scoring. In all three indicators, a better or stronger linkage is assumed to 
indicate a greater capability of a firm.    
The end-market capability category refers to the overall capabilities of firms to meet the specifications 
of several buyers in different markets, their ability to establish stable relations with those buyers and 
their market knowledge and promotion skills. It is measured using four indicators: number of end-
market regions, number of direct buyers (in direct sales or auction-direct), relation with buyers and 
marketing capability. For the first two indicators, it is assumed that the higher the number of the end-
market regions or the number of direct buyers that the firm has, the higher the capability of the firm. In 
the last two indicators, however, three steps were applied. In the case of relations with buyers, firms 
were asked to rate their relations with their direct buyers as stable, somewhat stable or ad-hoc. If they 
rated their relations as ‘stable’, then they were asked with how many of the buyers they worked for 
more than a year. A subjective assessment was applied in reaching a final score. For instance, if a firm 
has relations with half of its buyers for at least a year, ‘stable’ is granted; otherwise, the score is 
lowered to ‘somehow stable’. However, for buyers in the Middle East region, the method of payment 
(credit or advance payment) is used to assess buyer relations, since firms indicated that they could sell 
to buyers in the region on a credit basis only if they have stable relations. The last indicator is 
marketing capability, which is defined as the ability of a firm to develop a clear market strategy and 
implement coherent marketing activities such as market intelligence, promotion and branding. Here 
the final score is the composite of several separate questions that were asked in different sections of 
the questionnaire, and in some of them, the three steps are followed. Firms were asked whether they 
have a marketing strategy; to list their marketing activities, promotion and branding, and how often 
they do them; and whether they have a marketing unit to do those activities. Their responses were 
subjectively assessed largely based on the level of investment, coherence and consistency. 
The scores for each of the local firms on all of these indicators are presented in Table 5, along with 
aggregate scores for each capability category. Box 1 contains further details on the scoring on each 
indicator, explaining what constitutes a low, medium and high score. Two firms (H-Rose and I-Rose) 
are not included in Table 5 as they could not produce the required data during the firm survey. These 
two firms appeared to be on the verge of collapse at the time when the survey was carried out and had 
not exported for at least the preceding three months. 
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A-Rose 3 3 3 3 1 13 3 2 5 2 3 1 6 3 2 3 1 9
B-Rose 3 2 1 2 1 9 1 2 3 2 2 1 5 2 1 1 1 5
C-Rose 1 3 3 2 1 10 3 1 4 2 2 1 5 3 3 3 1 10
D-Rose 2 2 2 2 3 11 3 1 4 3 3 1 7 3 3 3 2 11
E-Rose 1 3 3 3 3 13 3 1 4 3 3 1 7 2 1 3 3 9
F-Rose 1 2 3 2 2 10 1 2 3 2 2 1 5 1 1 3 2 7
G-Rose 3 3 2 1 3 12 3 2 5 1 1 1 3 2 3 3 2 10
J-Rose 3 3 2 2 1 11 3 2 5 2 3 1 6 2 1 1 1 5
K-Rose 2 3 3 3 2 13 3 1 4 2 3 1 6 3 2 2 2 9
L-Rose 2 2 3 3 1 11 2 2 4 2 3 1 6 2 1 2 2 7
M-Rose 1 1 2 2 1 7 2 1 3 2 3 1 6 1 1 3 2 7
Note: sub-scores :Low=1, Medium=2, High=3
*Sum: Low=5-8; Medium=9-12; High=13-15
**Sum: Low=2; Medium=3-4; High=5
***Sum: Low=3-5; Medium=6-8; High=9
****Sum: Low=4-6; Medium=7-9; High=10-12









(4) end-market(3) Linkages(2) Input integation(1) Product and production process
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Box 1: Scoring of Indicators in Table 5 
Product and production process: 
i) number of varieties: firms that have seven to eleven varieties scored Low; 12 to 16 varieties scored
Medium; 17-21 varieties scored High.
ii) number of export days per week: firms that export for four days a week scored Low; five to six days
scored Medium; and firms that exported seven days a week scored High.
iii) internal reject rate: firms with the internal reject rate of six percent and above scored Low; five percent
reject rate scored Medium; and below five percent reject rate scored High.
iv) average labour turnover rate: firms with labour turnover rate above 20 percent scored Low; 11-20 percent
scored Medium; and with turnover rate below 10 percent scored High.
v) certification: firms that have certified for Bronze level of the local standard scored Low, firms with B2B
(MPS-ABC, SQ) scored Medium; and firms with business-to-business & consumer labels (FFP, Fairtrade)
scored High.
Input integration: 
i) importing inputs internally: firms that locally buy all or imports only sensitive chemicals and fertilizers
scored Low, importing around 50 percent of inputs internally scores Medium; and importing over 50 percent
scores High.
ii) in-house plant propagation: Firms that operate propagation internally scored High; and firms with no
internal propagation facilities scored Low.
Linkages: 
i) with other firms: firms that have limited cooperation with both local and foreign firms scored Low; firms
that cooperate with both local and foreign firms with some general competencies such as sharing experience,
hiring consultant jointly, visiting each other's firm scored Medium; and firms that cooperate with both local
and foreign firms in some core competencies such as marketing scored High.
ii) with EHPEA: member of the association but limited participation in meetings scored Low; members that
sometimes attend meetings and use services scored Medium; and members that participate in meetings and
actively take advantage of the services scored High.
iii) with sector-related institutions and research institutions- no or limited link is scored Low; medium links
such as accessing some supports scored Medium; and close links scored High.
End-market: 
i) number of end-market regions: firms that export to one region scored Low; two regions scored Medium; and
firms that export to three regions scored High.
ii) number of buyers in direct sale/auction-direct: firms that have one to three direct buyers scored Low; with
four to seven buyers scored Medium; and firms with eight to ten buyers scored High.
iii) relation with buyers:  firms who viewed their relation as ad hoc scored Low; Somewhat stable scored
Medium and Stable scored High.
iv) marketing capability: firms that have no clear strategy linked to its marketing activities score Low; firms
that depend primarily on their personal networks and firms that recently (in 2016) began implementing some
market activities guided by their strategy scored Medium; and firms that have clear market strategies and
implemented activities accordingly in a regular fashion scored High.
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Mapping the Technological Capabilities of Ethiopian-owned Firms 
Initial experience and investment capabilities.  Although the Ethiopian floriculture industry 
was pioneered by local entrepreneurs, the pioneer local firms had no initial experience in the 
sector.  The same applies to the 11 local firms included in the firm survey in 2016. These local 
firms reported undertaking similar investment preparations to enter the sector, such as 
conducting a feasibility study with help of both local and foreign consultants. They set up their 
firm with similar physical, operational and organizational structures, and they have similar 
modern greenhouses that are furnished with drip irrigation and computerized fertigation system. 
Only one firm (C-Rose) has a greenhouse with advanced technology such as climate sensors, 
which was required by its location at a higher altitude with relatively disease prone and 
challenging climate conditions. All of the local firms began operations with expatriates21 hired 
as consultants and/or as managers in some key positions. These expatriates, mainly from Kenya, 
India, Israel and the Netherlands, were the principal source of technology transfer, as they 
played a significant role in setting up the businesses (especially operational and organizational 
structures) as well as training key staff and managers. In addition, almost all of the firms 
selected their initial market channel and varieties based on the advice of these foreign 
consultants. 
All of the local firms have invested in learning and undergone significant changes since the 
initial investment period. For instance, all expatriate managers have been replaced with local 
ones, and consultants are hired only by a few firms and for shorter periods than before or only 
for specific needs. Regarding variety selection, all firms have learned about the greater risk 
associated with it, giving more attention and investment in selecting varieties than before. As 
one grower puts it ‘variety makes you or breaks you’. Local firms used consultants’ advice, 
imitation and the feedback of unpacking agents at the Dutch auction as mechanisms to learn 
about varieties. They also now reach out to buyers in different end-markets, channels and trade 
fairs to get more feedback that can help them to better understand the market trends and 
consumers’ tastes. In addition, some firms visit other farms in the country and abroad (mainly in 
Kenya) to gain insight on the characteristics of varieties. After such careful variety selections, 
most of the firms conduct a ‘variety trial’, which involves testing a variety for its growth, 
productivity, disease susceptibility, color, vase life and so on. This is especially crucial if there 
is no other farm in the neighborhood (in similar climate) that grows the same variety.  
Local firms have somewhat increased their capabilities in marketing. All farms joined the 
floriculture business with the Dutch auction in mind, as it is the most important global market 
                                                            
21 The expatriates might include foreigners who were already living/working in the country or who came to the 
country for the specific job in the flower firms.  
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and is easily accessible to all. At the beginning, market intelligence was low on the priorities of 
local firms; rather, they concentrated on building their rose producing capability in order to 
meet the requirements of the Dutch auction. But over time marketing capability became one of 
the primary concerns of all operating local firms, and the great majority are striving to diversify 
market channels and end-markets, as shown in Table 3.  
Product and production process capabilities. Except for one firm (M-Rose), all local firms 
scored medium or above on the sum score for product and process capabilities. Firms reported 
that they export seven to 21 varieties, and most of them export over 12 varieties while only two 
firms export below 10 varieties. This implies that all firms have developed considerable 
capabilities in dealing with a larger number of varieties. Moreover, the number of varieties that 
a firm can supply to market demonstrates its potential to expand its reach. In the Dutch auction, 
firms can easily clear large volumes of a single variety or a few varieties of flowers; whereas, 
the direct sales channel tends to require a large number of varieties but in smaller volumes. 
Most of the local firms export every day, with only one firm (M-Rose) exporting just four days 
a week. Regarding firms’ rate of internal reject, only one firm (B-Rose) has a higher reject rate 
than the average of the national industry (5% reject), while the rest have below or equal to the 
industry average rate. However, despite their effort to export only top-grade flowers, some firms 
mentioned that their flowers are sometimes re-graded at the auction.22   
The capabilities of local firms in relation to product and production process were further 
assessed based on their average rate of labor turnover and their adoption of international 
standards (indicated by certification). Most of the firms indicated that they faced challenges in 
keeping labor stable or in securing a year-round sufficient labor force. All firms provide 
permanent employment contracts, as required by the national regulations, and they pay a 
minimum wage of 750 to 900 ETB (equivalent to USD 35-4223) per month. In addition, all 
firms, except G-Rose, have some incentives schemes and benefits for workers, and all firms, 
except for B-Rose and G-Rose, reported that they provide regular training on work and safety 
related issues. Despite these strategies, most of the firms still face a relatively high rate of labor 
turnover and/or labor shortage. However, this is not unique to the local firms, but rather is a 
phenomenon that characterizes the entire industry (Abebe and Schaefer 2015; Oqubay 2015). 
All of the local firms adopted international standards such as MPS, Fair Flower and Fair Plants 
                                                            
22 Firms were asked to estimate the re-graded percent of flowers, but they were reluctant to give a specific figure. 
They only mentioned that the overall market reject rate is less than 1%. Re-grading of flowers happens occasionally, 
but the flowers will still be sold at a lower price.  
23 The approximate exchange rate of June 2016 is applied (1USD = ETB 21.6096) based on 
https://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/. 
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and Fairtrade, except G-Rose which only has the required local standard (Bronze Level). As 
mentioned earlier, certification is both a tool for marketing as well as for improving the 
production process. MPS-ABC is a widely adopted certificate scheme in the global floriculture 
industry as well as among local firms. Apart from G-Rose, all local firms adopted at least MPS-
ABC, which requires good agricultural practices and environmental protection. But if a firm is 
certified for MPS-ABC and SQ, such as D-Rose, it must also adopt a protocol that directly or 
indirectly influences labor processes and management. Although certificates or standards are not 
required to access the Dutch auction, it is a common norm that most of the suppliers (over 80%) 
are certified for MPS (Rikken 2010).  Furthermore, these requirements get more stringent with 
consumer labels, which also serve as important instruments to differentiate products and open 
up opportunities to enter certain niche markets. Fair Flower and Fair Plants (MPS-A +SQ) and 
Fairtrade are consumer labels, and 36 percent of the local firms are certified to one or both of 
these labels.  The local standards, of which Bronze Level is presumed to be a statutory 
minimum, focus on basic farm management systems, safety and protection of workers and 
environment. However, in practice, Bronze Level is poorly enforced.  
Input integration. Technological capabilities of firms are further measured by looking at firms’ 
ability to organize major inputs.  The two indicators show firms’ capacity to import inputs and 
to propagate their own plants in-house. Chemicals, fertilizers and packaging materials are the 
most important inputs needed in the cut-flower sector. While packaging materials are produced 
in Ethiopia, chemicals and fertilizers are fully imported either by independent importing 
companies in the country or by flower firms themselves (importing internally). All firms 
indicated that importing all inputs internally, including packaging materials, is cheaper (by 15% 
to 30%) and safer (in terms of quality and availability) than buying it from independent 
importers or local producers. However, because of its huge financial implications, most of the 
firms are forced to limit the share of internally imported inputs. Most of the firms import over 
50% of their chemicals and fertilizers internally, while buying a larger share of packaging 
materials locally, but there are a few exceptions such as G-Rose, which imports all inputs 
internally.  Similarly, although propagation services are available locally, firms and experts in 
the sector think that vertically integrating the activity into the firm is significantly more efficient 
than buying from local providers, as it permits local firms to control the process as well as costs. 
Thus, importing a larger share of inputs and having in-house plant propagation not only implies 
that a firm has higher financial, logistical and technical capabilities but also that the firm is 
better able to minimize costs.  The financial challenges regarding input integration are mainly 
related to accessing foreign exchange rather than working capital. As there is often a shortage of 
foreign exchange, National Bank directives regulate access. Even though exporters might have 
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some privileges, they are inadequate to completely alleviate the challenge of accessing the 
foreign exchange.       
Linkage capabilities. All firms reported good linkages with their service providers, including 
financial services, cargo transport services and breeders’ services (access to and advice on 
variety) and all firms own cool-trucks for local ground transportation of flowers. However, there 
is some variation on the indicators measuring linkages with other firms in the industry, with 
sector specific institutions such as EHPEA, EHDA, and with knowledge institutions such as 
universities and research centers.  
Local firms have a certain level of cooperation amongst themselves as well as with some 
foreign firms. Geographical proximity (clusters) is important to develop certain types of 
cooperation such as frequent contact between managers, information exchange and collectively 
hiring consultants. However, clustering does not seem to matter to cooperate on core activities 
such as marketing. The firm E-Rose developed cooperation with foreign firms (Dutch and 
Indian) to enhance its marketing capabilities. Additionally, friendships, between some local and 
foreign firms, have emerged and resulted in knowledge transfer in an informal environment. For 
example, K-Rose mentioned that it sees one Dutch firm as its model farm, and it has close 
business interactions with the owner that developed into a friendship. 
Regarding linkages with institutions, the local firms only acknowledged their industry 
association (EHPEA) as a vibrant and useful institution with which most of them have a good 
connection. Apart from representation, the EHPEA is an important node linking them with the 
global industry as well as with some national institutions. Most firms (more than 60%) reported 
that they actively participate in association meetings and access services provided by the 
association, while a few firms mentioned only occasional involvement and one firm (G-Rose) 
reported that its link barely goes beyond a membership. During the period of the firm survey 
fieldwork, nine of the 11 firms participated in training that was jointly organized and financed 
by the industry association and the Dutch CBI.24 A few firms reported traveling to the USA to 
promote their products with the help of the association. In contrast to strong linkages with the 
industry association, all firms reported weak linkages with other support or research institutions. 
Most of them described EHDA, the lead government agency which was once a very important 
and supportive institution, as a dead organization (የሞተ ሆኖዋል), and some said ‘the honey-moon 
is over!’, to denote the diminishing of the government’s support and enthusiasm towards the 
sector. 
                                                            
24 The training included individual firm coaching and on-site training focusing on marketing, post-harvest and cool-
chain management and corporate social responsibility with a focus on gender and human resource management. It 
began in 2015 and continues until 2017.   
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End-market. Local firms have been making an increasing effort to diversify their end-markets. 
Five regions are identified as destinations of flowers exported by local firms: Western Europe 
(the Netherlands and UK), Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, and Greek), Middle East (Saudi 
Arabia and UAE), Northeast Asia (Japan and Korea) and North America (the USA).25 Each firm 
exports to one to three regions, but the majority of them export to more than one region. Five of 
the 11 firms export to two regions, while four firms export to three regions. In addition, nine of 
the firms are engaged in direct sales (including auction-direct), and most of them have more 
than five direct buyers, while the rest (except one, L-Rose) have two to three direct buyers.  
In the floriculture global value chain, consumers’ tastes can vary across regions. In addition, 
countries set distinct and sometimes overlapping regulations on products that enter their 
jurisdictions. For instance, as explained by some firms, Japan’s national regulation has near zero 
tolerance for pests. If a single pest is found, the whole product needs to go through a fumigation 
procedure, at a great cost to the supplier firm. The Dutch auction, or the European market in 
general, has its own minimum requirements regarding pests but is relatively less strict than 
Japan and some parts of the United States. Some countries in the Middle East have less strict 
requirements and weak enforcement mechanisms than all the other regions mentioned.  
Furthermore, consumers in the Middle East prefer relatively matured roses or roses at a higher 
opening stage (e.g. stage 4), while the Dutch auction requires roses of an earlier opening stage 
(opening stage 2).26 Such variation across regions has implications for firms’ capabilities in 
meeting distinct legal and market requirements. Moreover, specifications of individual buyers 
often go beyond these general conditions (legal and market) as they have their own 
requirements in relation to, for example, quality, volume and delivery. However, buyers in the 
Middle East and Southern Europe have less stringent requirements and yet offer a better price 
compared to other end-market regions.  
Even though having larger numbers of export destinations and direct buyers can indicate higher 
levels of technological capabilities, as firms have to meet the requirements of diverse end-
markets, it does not necessarily show how good firms are at meeting these specifications in a 
consistent manner. Some qualitative assessment can help to balance the measures of end-market 
capabilities. To this end, firms’ relations with buyers and their overall marketing capabilities 
were assessed. These issues are important in the global industry, which is characterized by stiff 
competition where the supply of flowers often surpasses the demand. To remain competitive, 
25 Two firms reported selling to France and Norway but it is often done through the Netherlands. 
26 Opening stages refer to maturity level of roses. Roses with early opening stage (stage 2) have a tighter flower head 
with less visible colour and it opens slowly and can have longer vase life, while the opposite is the case for roses with 
advanced opening stage (stage 4).   
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firms not only need capabilities to find buyers (in the case of the auction, to track their frequent 
buyers) but also to build relations with them. This process typically involves issues beyond 
meeting product requirements, such as regular communication, negotiation, commitment and 
trust.  Most of the firms that have direct buyers reported to have stable relations with half or 
more of their buyers, as they have had relations for over one year and are able to sell on a credit 
basis.27 Firms that sell via the auction clock only (F-Rose and M-Rose) indicated that they trace 
their most frequent buyers on a regular basis and have established stable relations with some of 
them. However, one firm (E-Rose) took its relation with auction clock buyers one step further 
and established a direct sales relationship within the auction system (auction-direct).   
Accessing various end-markets and establishing stable relations with buyers are largely 
influenced by the overall marketing capabilities of firms, which are defined as the ability of 
firms to develop a clear market strategy and implement coherent marketing activities such as 
market intelligence, promotion and branding.  Unlike other indicators of end-market capabilities 
where several firms scored high, here only one firm (E-Rose) showed high performance, while 
half of the remaining ten firms scored low. These low scoring firms (A-Rose, B-Rose, and C-
Rose) seem to act sporadically and lack a clear market strategy; they might diversify to a new 
market without necessarily conducting basic market intelligence and preparation. Some of them 
might invest on promotions and branding but seem to lack consistency and commitment. 
However, A-Rose and C-Rose have relatively larger numbers of buyers and end-markets than 
the firm with the highest score in marketing capabilities (E-Rose). There are also firms that have 
recently invested in strengthening their marketing capabilities. For example, F-Rose, K-Rose, L-
Rose and M-Rose invested in market intelligence, consumer relations, business standards and 
regular promotions. In contrast, D-Rose and G-Rose, which have the highest numbers of direct 
buyers, reported to fully rely on their personal network to market their product in different end-
markets without necessarily investing in business standards and branding. For instance, G-Rose 
is the only firm that does not have a certification of meeting any international standards and yet 
is able to sell in Southern Europe and the Middle East via the direct sales channel. D-Rose, 
which only has certification for business-to-business standard, exports to Western Europe and 
the Middle East via direct sales channel, which seems to contradict the common perception that 
consumer labels are mandatory in the European direct sales channel.      
 
                                                            
27 In the absence of a guaranteed payment system as in the Dutch auction, firms depend on trust to sell on a credit 
basis. This is especially the case with buyers in the Middle East; firms indicated selling only with advance payment 
until they established trust or stable relations with buyers.   
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Table 6:   Aggregate Technological Capability Scores of Ethiopian-owned Flower Firms 
 
The sum scores on each capability category as well as the aggregate technological capability 
scores of local firms are presented in Table 6. The overall levels of technological capabilities are 
marked with different colors. Apart from B-Rose, all of the firms had a sum score of medium or 
above in most of the four capability categories, illustrating that they increased their capabilities 
since entering the industry. One firm had an aggregate score of high and three firms had an 
aggregate score of medium-high, while only one firm scored low-medium (B-Rose). 
Interestingly, only L-Rose had a uniform score across the four capability categories, while the 
rest show variation. This result implies that firms do not build all types of capabilities at the 
same time and to the same level. However, the degree of disparity varies from firm to firm. 
While some firms appear with relatively closer scores in all capabilities, others have extremely 
contrasting results such as G-Rose and J-Rose, which have low and high scores (i.e. mixed 
scores). Highlighting these dynamics is important for understanding firms’ investment in 
learning as well as the factors that influence the process of developing technological 
capabilities.  To this end, the final section of the paper compares the aggregate technological 
capability scores of the local firms with some competitiveness measures to see whether there are 
relationships between the two and if that influences investment in learning. 
 
A-Rose H H M M HHMM High
B-Rose M M L L MMLL Low-med
C-Rose M M L H MMLM Medium
D-Rose H M M H MMMH Med-high
E-Rose H M M M HMMM Med-high
F-Rose M M L M MMLM Medium
G-Rose M H L H MHLH Mixed
J-Rose M H M L MHML Mixed
K-Rose H M M M HMMM Med-high
L-Rose M M M M MMMM Medium
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Comparing firms’ technological capabilities and competitiveness 
Competitiveness in the floriculture global value chain depends on productivity, product 
attributes and price, which indicate an inherent relationship between capabilities and 
competitiveness. The above discussed technological capabilities of firms have a direct or 
indirect influence on productivity, product and price. However, further evidence can be useful to 
unveil the explicit links between the two and to deepen our understanding of the links between 
capabilities and competitiveness in influencing the learning process of firms. To measure the 
competitiveness of firms, three indicators were developed using data collected in the firm 
survey, from EHDA and from end-market actors in the Dutch auction. 
First, the export trend of firms (average growth rate of export value and volume) and firms’ 
export share of the total export of local firms are calculated for two periods (2005-2010 and 
2011-2015) using data from EHDA. As Table 7 shows, the export trends of firms demonstrate a 
large leap in the period of 2005-2010 or 2011-2015 due to firms starting operations; given the 
growth cycle of rose plants, the productivity of rose plants reaches its highest level between the 
second and third year of its age. Apart from firm-level issues, export trends can be influenced by 
land available for expansion. Therefore, the study is not interested in the magnitude of the 
export trend, but rather in whether the trend is positive, stagnant or negative. Table 7 shows that 
all local firms have a positive export trend in the first period but this changed slightly in the 
second period as two firms exhibit a negative trend. Interestingly, of these two firms with a 
negative export trend in the second period, one has an aggregate technological capability score 
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Table 7: Export Share and Export Trend of Ethiopian-owned Flower Firms (value and 
volume)  
 
Source: author’s calculation based on data obtained from EHDA. 
 
Regarding export share, firms have almost similar shares in both export value and volume, but 
for the sake of consistency, export value is used as an indicator. As Table 7 shows, in the period 
2011 to 2015, the average export share of the 11 firms is nine percent while the maximum and 
minimum are 15 and four percent respectively. Most of the firms that have a larger share (from 
nine to 15 percent) have high or medium-high aggregate technological capability scores, but one 
firm has a low-medium score (B-Rose) and one firm has a mixed score (J-Rose). Most of these 
firms kept their position from the 2005-2010 period in having above the average export shares, 
but the share of B-Rose declined significantly from 35 to nine percent.28 Whereas firms with an 
export share below the average demonstrate medium or mixed capability scores and compared 
to the first period (2005-2010), these firms showed growth in export share.  
It is noteworthy that despite their similarity in age and size, the pace of growth is different 
across the local firms. In general, within the two periods, some firms increased their share 
slightly (e.g. C-Rose, F-Rose, and G-Rose), a few experienced a sharp increase or decrease (J-
Rose, K-Rose, B-Rose), while others—especially firms that have larger market share in both 
                                                            
28 This B-Rose’s high share (35%) in 2005-2010 is largely due to the fact that most of the other firms has been just 

























A-Rose 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.13 0.88 0.38 -0.22 -0.15 High
B-Rose 0.29 0.35 0.07 0.09 0.37 0.08 -0.07 -0.03 Low-med
C-Rose 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.71 0.52 0.56 0.45 Medium
D-Rose 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.09 2.36 1.37 0.03 0.01 Med-high
E-Rose 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.62 0.41 0.04 0.10 Med-high
F-Rose 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 4.34 4.63 0.22 0.20 Medium
G-Rose 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.25 0.12 0.22 Mixed
J-Rose 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.78 Mixed
K-Rose 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.15 1.43 1.66 0.00 0.11 Med-high
L-Rose 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.09 1.54 1.64 0.07 0.08 Medium
M-Rose 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.06 3.47 4.05 0.10 0.11 Medium
average 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 1.45 1.36 0.14 0.17
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periods—showed a slight decrease in the second period (A-Rose, D-Rose, E-Rose). These 
trends indicate that firms go through their own learning path, each facing to a different degree, 
rapid growth, stagnant periods and setbacks. Thus, the link between firms’ technological 
capability and competitiveness gets more complex and dynamic as a firm goes through its 
learning process, with ups and downs along the path. Notwithstanding that, even from such 
static data, some relationships between capability scores of firms and their competitiveness can 
be traced.   
The nexus between technological capabilities and competitiveness is further explored by 
looking at firms’ annual export value per worker, average export volume (number of stems) per 
hectare, price and profit/loss. The type of product can influence yield per hectare, but as the 
firms largely grow similar types of roses, the difference would not be that significant. In any 
case, we attempted to offset this limitation by measuring export value per worker as well. 
Regarding profit/loss, firms indicated only the number of times they made loss since starting 
operation and their experience in 2015. 
 
Table 8:  Performance of Ethiopian-owned Flower Firms 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on firm survey, interviews, and data collected from EHDA.  
Note: For export value, export volume and number of workers, firms gave their estimate based on their 2015-2016 
experience. However, compared to the data of EHDA, their estimate is a little bit overstated, especially for value. Due 
to that EHDA data of 2015 is applied in the calculation of export value and export volume but number of workers 
taken as given by firms which in turn might slightly over/under state value per worker. Price score is given based on 
the ranking of buyers and unpacking agents in the Dutch auction so data for G-Rose is missing since it does not sell 
in this end-market. Cultivated land per hectares is as of June 2016 excluding expansion progress. It was attempted but 
difficult to get reliable and complete data on revenue and cost breakdowns from all firms.   
 
Firms




 (in # of 
cultivated















A-Rose 14,465,650 26 550  556,371  1,865,251  3,391 Low loss High
B-Rose 14,170,380 27 710  524,829  2,066,526  2,911 Low-medium loss Low-med
C-Rose 15,182,777 16 400  948,924  2,208,481  5,521 Medum profit Medium
D-Rose 18,769,383 20 520  938,469  2,215,265  4,260 Low-medium profit Med-high
E-Rose 28,370,112 15 420  1,891,341  3,947,272  9,398 High profit Med-high
F-Rose 11,627,732 10 260  1,162,773  1,319,730  5,076 Medum-high profit Medium
G-Rose    7,814,060 18 300  434,114  1,143,896  3,813 profit Mixed
J-Rose 43,939,168 38 955  1,156,294  5,039,542  5,277 Low loss Mixed
K-Rose 29,893,881 27 675  1,107,181  3,920,504  5,808 Medum loss Med-high
L-Rose 24,253,971 17.5 480  1,385,941  2,667,489  5,557 Medium breakeven Medium
M-Rose 12,890,087 12 400  1,074,174  1,740,157  4,350 Medium-high loss Medium
Average  20,125,200  21  515  1,016,401  2,557,647  5,033 
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Again, the analysis not only shows some clear correlations between capability scores and 
competitiveness of firms but also reveals more complex relations. For instance, most of the 
local firms with an aggregate technological capability score of medium to high exhibited higher 
(above average) performance in export value per worker (average USD 5,033); whereas, a firm 
that scored low-medium shows below average performance. Nevertheless, there are firms that 
have a mismatch between the capability score and performance. For example, D-Rose and A-
Rose achieved a higher capability score but below average export value per worker and export 
volume per hectares. Furthermore, the two firms that have mixed capability scores appear with 
opposite performance in competitiveness. While one (J-Rose) performs high (above average) in 
both indicators, the other firm (G-Rose) shows a performance far below average.  In relation to 
profit/loss, all firms that declared profit or breakeven have capability scores of medium or above 
(except G-Rose, which has a mixed capability score). Nevertheless, there are firms with a 
variety of capability scores (from high to low-medium) that reported losses.  
The dynamics and complexity of the relationship becomes more nuanced with the last indicator 
of competitiveness, which is price.  Prominent end-market actors were interviewed, including 
buyers/e-traders and unpacking agents at the Dutch auction, to gather reliable data on price.29 
Both groups of respondents (buyers and unpacking agents) agree that consistency—in terms of 
quality, volume and availability (presence) at the auction/market—is the most important factor 
in obtaining a higher price as well as for obtaining better terms of contract in direct sales. The 
views of these end-market actors were very useful in understanding the rules of the game in the 
Dutch market vis-à-vis the capabilities and competitiveness of firms.  
Looking at the current (2016) price performance of firms, E-Rose fetches the highest price of all 
the local firms, and this is consistent with other competitiveness indicators as well as the 
capability score of E-Rose. M-Rose and F-Rose are ranked second and third in price but their 
capability scores are at the lower end of medium. Moreover, M-Rose recorded below average 
performance in some of the other indicators of competitiveness. The price performance of A-
Rose and J-Rose stood at the lowest end, while the rest (B-Rose, C-Rose, E-Rose, K-Rose, and 
L-Rose) at a medium level (that is between F-Rose and A-Rose or J-Rose), although some are 
closer to the higher end. In other words, for a rose of the same variety, E-Rose often earns 4-5 
Euro cents more per stem than the rest of the local firms on average. However, M-Rose and F-
                                                            
29 Interviews were conducted during October and November 2016 at their respective offices in or near Flora-Holland 
auction houses.  All local firms except E-Rose and G-Rose use the same unpacking agent but the interviewed 
unpackers and buyers are familiar with performance of E-Rose. However, there is not much information on G-Rose 
since it no longer sells in the Netherlands. 
CAE WORKING PAPER 2017: 2                                                                                                                                 40 
 
Rose are not far behind, earning 2-4 Euro cents more than the rest of the local firms and C-
Rose30, K-Rose and L-Rose earn 1-2 Euro cents more than the remaining firms.  
Price performance is directly influenced by local firms’ consistency, which is measured by the 
function of the three factors (quality, volume and availability of supplier in the specific market 
channel). Fluctuation (beyond a certain limit) in any one of the three factors negatively affects 
the price of the product in the Dutch auction as well as contracts in direct sales. In addition to 
that, trust-based communication31 (personal as well as virtual) plays a significant role in 
boosting the three factors and hence the price.  
Requiring supplier firms to be consistent is not unique to the Dutch market, but it is rather 
common in both market channels and in several end-markets but the degree of importance might 
vary. Yet this does not minimize the fact that exporting to diversified end-markets can pose a 
serious challenge to consistency. This implies that developing higher technological capabilities 
can result in fetching a proportional price (competitiveness) only if it is played by the rule of the 
end-market/market channel. Hence it makes sense if firms decide to selectively develop the 
capabilities that enable them to meet the rules of their targeted end-market or market channel 
and thus obtain a higher price. Rules of individual buyers and end-market/market channels are 
not completely uniform, so if firms want to sell in different end-markets/channels, they might 
need to build or deepen several capabilities in order to consistently comply with all rules of 
different end-market/market channels without sacrificing one for another. This might include, 
but not be limited to, increasing the size of the farm, introducing new varieties, applying 
different production processes, marketing techniques and so on.  
Firms go through choosing end-markets/channels and developing capabilities all the time but 
each has its own learning path to smoothen out capability vis-à-vis end-market(s) requirements 
while keeping its broader position in all end-markets. For instance, if a firm that sells via Dutch 
auction wants to expand to the Middle East, it needs to make sure that the new move would not 
affect its consistency (quality, volume, and availability) in the Dutch market, otherwise the steps 
the firm has taken in order to cater to the Middle East might affect its competitiveness (price) in 
the Dutch auction, at least temporarily. The more diversified the end-markets are, the more 
challenging this task would become.  
As discussed above, E-Rose, F-Rose and M-Rose seem to choose to sell through a single market 
channel (Dutch auction), and they get a higher price than all the firms that sell in several end-
                                                            
30 Apart from consistency, this firm’s price is influenced by its product type (larger head size) due to its higher 
altitude.  
31 This communication includes exchanging information, handling inquiries and negotiations, personal visits, 
informal/formal meetings and so on.  
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markets/market channels regardless of their capability scores. The fact that these firms’ focus on 
a single market channel might help them achieve higher consistency in all the three factors, 
alongside building a reputation, than the rest of the local firms. Therefore, in order to be 
competitive, firms may not necessarily need to build all capabilities, rather they might develop 
strategically selected ones that are needed for ‘reaching a better deal’ (profitability, minimized 
costs, stable income flow) in a given end-market/market channels or preferred export 
trajectories. In the face of highly competitive world markets and rising standards, the 
sustainability of such a strategy might be debatable. On the other hand, a strategy of relying on a 
single end-market or market channel entails high risk.   
The export trajectories of Ethiopian-owned Flower Firms 
End-markets specifications influence competitiveness in a way that can affect firms’ decision to 
invest in learning and building different categories of technological capabilities.  Therefore, the 
local firms are categorized into three export trajectories depending on their market channels and 
end-markets: trajectory 1, largely Dutch auction but diversified end-markets; trajectory 2, direct 
sales only; and trajectory 3, Dutch auction only. Table 9 presents the capability score and 
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Table 9:  Capability Score and Competitiveness Measures of Ethiopian-owned Flower 
Firms by Export Trajectory 










price profit Capability 
score 
 
Trajectory-1 (largely Dutch auction but diversified end-markets) 
A-Rose FFP 
CoP-Silver 
13 555,372 3,391 Low Loss High 





4 948,924 5,521 Medium Profit Medium 
J-Rose MPS-ABC 11 1,156,294 5,277 Low Profit Mixed 
K-Rose FFP, CoP-
Gold 
15 1,107,181 5,808 Medium Loss Medium-high 
L-Rose FFP, 
Fairtrade 
9 1,385,941 5557 Medium Breakeven Medium 
 
Trajectory-2 (direct sales only) 
D-Rose MPS-
ABC, SQ 





5 434,114 3,808 - Profit Mixed 
 
Trajectory-3 (Dutch auction only) 
E-Rose FFP 14 1,891,341 9,398 High Profit Medium-high 
F-Rose MPS-
ABC, SQ 
4 1,162,773 5,076 Medium-
high 
Profit Medium 





 Trajectory 1: Largely auction but diversified end-markets 
This trajectory includes local firms that largely sell via Dutch auction but try to diversify to all 
kinds of end-markets. It includes A-Rose, B-Rose, C-Rose, J-Rose, K-Rose and L-Rose. These 
firms have mixed performance in competitiveness and capabilities. Half of the firms (C-Rose, 
K-Rose and L-Rose) exhibit relatively stronger performance in both, while the other half have 
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mixed results. B-Rose is exceptional as it shows a lower performance in both capability score 
and competitiveness. Regarding profit/loss, some of the firms have made loss only once or 
twice since they started operation (A-Rose, K-Rose and L-Rose), while the others reported a 
loss for three or more times.  Although firms in this trajectory are generally dependent on the 
Dutch auction, they show a stronger desire to diversify to other end-markets and market 
channels. As shown in Table 1, all of the firms in this group export to two or three regions, and 
for most of them, the Middle East is the second most important destination. Despite such a 
tendency to diversify end-markets, some of these firms do not seem to have a clear marketing 
strategy that is coherent with their marketing activities.   
However, entering a new end-market essentially demands some deliberation on how it impacts 
the broader market position of a firm. Some preparations and adjustments are needed, which 
might mean deepening certain capabilities more than others or making strategic choices in 
developing selected capabilities that make more sense vis-à-vis firm’s trajectory.  This can be 
more complicated if the end-markets have distinct requirements that cannot be met with the 
same production process, such as with the Dutch auction and the Middle East. Thus, if a firm 
enters these two end-markets without proper planning and preparation, it might find it difficult 
to strengthen its position within either of these end-markets. Such a process largely involves 
learning-by-doing, which might cause loss-making until the right capabilities are developed or 
new routines are mastered. In turn, this process affects the nexus of firms’ capabilities and 
competitiveness.  
Trajectory 2: Direct sales only 
This trajectory consists of firms that only sell via the direct sales channel: D-Rose and G-Rose. 
These two firms are similar in choosing direct sales as their market channel and in using 
personal networks to market and promote their products. Although both firms moved away from 
the Dutch auction to direct sales to Europe and the Middle East, D-Rose is still closely 
embedded in the network around the auction, while G-Rose is more connected to the Middle 
East market. Both firms show mixed performance in competitiveness, but G-Rose is mostly at 
the lower end in all aspects except in profit/loss. Even though both firms reported a profit in 
2015, in the past G-Rose experienced more loss-making years than D-Rose which only made 
loss once. In terms of capability score, D-Rose scored medium-high, while G-Rose showed a 
mixed score. Furthermore, G-Rose is the only firm that does not adopt international certificates, 
because they are less relevance in the end-markets targeted by the firm such as the Middle East 
and Southern Europe (Spain, Greek, and Italy). Similarly, although D-Rose sells directly to 
Western Europe, it did not feel the need to take on consumer labels.  
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Trajectory 3: Dutch auction only 
Firms in this trajectory sell via Dutch auction/auction-direct only: E-Rose, F-Rose and M-Rose. 
Like the firms in the above two trajectories, these firms also show variation in their capability 
scores (medium and medium-high) as well as in competitiveness. However, all three firms show 
a more consistent correlation between performance in capabilities and competitiveness. E-Rose 
scores higher in both capabilities and competitiveness. F-Rose shows medium performance in 
both capabilities and competitiveness, while M-Rose scores a bit lower in some competitiveness 
measures. E-Rose is the only firm that never made a loss, but the other two firms in this 
category reported making a loss at least once. The three firms seem to have similar marketing 
strategies but their progress varies. E-Rose appears to have a stronger position in the Dutch 
auction than the other two firms.  
As mentioned earlier, almost all firms began exporting via the Dutch auction but over time they 
took different paths. The local firms’ export trajectories in 2016 were the outcomes of learning-
by-doing processes that can involve progress as well as setbacks; in turn, this can affect the 
correlation between capability and competitiveness measures.  
Conclusion 
This paper presented an overview of the Ethiopian floriculture industry, including its emergence 
and development in the context of the floriculture global value chain. It highlighted the role of 
local and foreign investment as well as government industrial policy and official development 
cooperation. Despite facing challenges arising from the global financial crisis, Ethiopia’s 
floriculture export industry became the fifth largest in the world and the third largest supplier of 
the European market.  The paper highlighted that the position of local firms, however 
significantly, declined over time, from 38 in 2007 to 15 in 2016.  
A local firm survey was carried out with 13 of the 16 local firms in June 2016 to assess their 
technological capabilities. The joint venture firm was excluded from the survey after initial 
research showed that the local investor was not an active partner. It was not possible to include 
the remaining two firms in the survey, both of which are connected to the business empire of 
Mohammed Hussein Ali Al-'Amoudi. Of the 13 surveyed firms, 11 of them were actively 
operating while two were struggling for their survival. The ownership of local firms included 
indigenous business families, diaspora investors and party-owned firms, as well as firms linked 
to Al-Amoudi’s business empire. None of the local firms had prior experience in the floriculture 
industry before investing. They hired foreign expertise as consultants and managers, who played 
a significant role in setting up the business, training workers and advising in important decisions 
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such as selecting varieties and market channels.  The role of foreign expertise has changed over 
time, as the firms engaged in learning by doing. Foreign experts largely have been replaced by 
locals, workers have been trained by internal experts, and firms have been taking the lead in 
selecting varieties as well as markets. Along the way, each firm has built its technological 
capabilities in an idiosyncratic way.  
The local firm survey measured the capabilities of each firm in terms of the core functions 
required to enter and operate in the floriculture global value chain but allowing for variation in 
market channels and end-market diversification. The results of the firm survey were analyzed in 
terms of four categories of capabilities—product and production process, input integration, 
linkages and end-market—and several indicators were created for each category based on 
questions from the survey. The aggregate technological capability scores show that all firms 
have developed their capabilities, as they scored medium and above in most categories. 
However, none of the firms, except one, showed a uniform score across the four capability 
categories, which means that firms did not build all categories of capabilities to the same level. 
This was even the case for firms with relatively similar age and size.  
The paper compared the firms’ aggregate capability score with some indicators of 
competitiveness, including export share, export volume per hectare, export value per worker, 
profitability and price. The findings point to a complex relationship between firms’ capabilities 
and competitiveness. Although there are some firms that had a clear correlation between the 
two, other firms appeared with mismatching results: for example, exhibiting higher capability 
scores but lower performance in competitiveness measures. Evidence such as firms’ export 
trends and export volumes highlight dynamics within the firms, as they experienced rapid 
growth as well as periods of stagnation and setbacks.  
The complexity of the relationship between capabilities and competitiveness, as well as the 
potential influence on firms’ investment in learning, was further nuanced by examining price. 
Firms that specialized in the Dutch auction market channel and developed the specific 
capabilities required to perform well in this market—consistency in quality, quantity and 
presence at the auction—obtained higher unit prices in the auction than local firms which 
operated in multiple market channels, and thus had trouble achieving as high a level of 
consistency in the Dutch auction. This finding indicates that firms can increase their 
competitiveness (measured in term of unit price) by selectively deepening capabilities that are 
important to meeting the requirements of the targeted market channel.  
The different export trajectories among firms can explain some of the discrepancies between 
capabilities and competitiveness. Three trajectories were identified: firms that largely sell via 
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Dutch auction but try to diversify to all kinds of end-markets (trajectory 1); firms that sell via 
direct sales only (trajectory 2); and firms that sell via Dutch auction only (trajectory 3). Firms in 
trajectory 1 face the challenge of meeting different specifications of several end-markets in a 
consistent manner, and the process might sometimes cause mismatches in their capabilities and 
competitiveness as it can involve financing losses until new routines are mastered and/or one or 
more capabilities are deepened in a way to strengthen the firms’ position in end-market(s). 
However, some of the firms in this trajectory seem to lack a clear marketing strategy that is 
coherently linked with marketing activities. To some extent firms in trajectory 2 face similar 
challenges as they sell to different buyers. But since they often sell in fixed contracts and use 
personal networks in marketing, they are in a better position to deal with different 
specifications. Nevertheless, the firms in this trajectory also have mismatches in their capability 
score and competitiveness. Amongst other things, this might be due to the considerable 
differences in their personal networks and associated end-markets, where one sets higher 
business standards than the other. In Trajectory 3, despite differences between each other, the 
firms appear to be more consistent among, scoring relatively similar results in both capability 
and competitiveness.  
To deepen our understanding of such complexity, more information is needed about these firms. 
The next phase of the research focuses on further understanding the factors that explain firms’ 
choices, their aggregate level of capabilities, as well as the particular export trajectory they are 
following and how it may influence which capabilities get built. In doing so, the research will 
examine the impacts of firm-specific characteristics, the national institutional context and global 
value chain dynamics on firms’ investments in learning, capability building and competitiveness 
outcomes, and also the mechanisms through which learning takes places. For this purpose, we 
have selected a sample of local firms with which to conduct firm histories—a qualitative 
method based on repeated interviews with firm owners, management staff, workers at the firm 
sites, combined with extensive interviews with relevant government officials, sector institutions, 
industry actors, experts and foreign firms in relation to their influence on the selected firms’ 
processes of learning and building capabilities. The sample includes firms from each of the 
three trajectories, and they were strategically selected to capture variation in export performance 
and type of local ownership. Accordingly, the following firms have been selected for the firm 
histories: A-Rose, B-Rose, E-Rose, G-Rose, H-Rose, I-Rose, J-Rose, and K-Rose.  
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Annex 1 
Floriculture Sector Local Firm Survey Questionnaire 
Ethiopia 2016 (administered by the researcher) 
 
 
PART I:  FIRM PROFILE 
 
Name of firm  
 




Name of interviewee 
Job title  





b) Indigenous-diaspora (lived outside the country for an 
extended period of time) 
c) Diaspora (may not have citizenship, but lives their 
permanently) 
d) Joint venture (specify equity distribution and management 
control) 
Date of establishment 
Date of production/export 
 
 
Total size of land 
holding(ha) 
 
Cultivated land size (ha) 
 
 
Number of employees 
 
 





b) Summer flower 
c) Bouquet flowers 
d) horticulture 
Name main product: 




Export destinations (%) a) Europe 
-auction 
-direct 
b) Middle east 
c) Other 





e) Middle east 
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Other 




Certificates: a) Bronze: 
c) MPS: 
c) other (specify) 
 
 
PART II: INVESTMENT 
 
Was a feasibility study 
carried out before the 




Had the owner/GM 
experience in the sector or 





How did the firm get 
managerial expertise and 
skilled labour in the 
beginning? 
a) Buy it from abroad (foreigners). From where? 
b) Employ nationals with previous work experience 
in flower farms. From which firms? 
c) Trained workers and/or managers 




a) Allocated by govt 
b) Based on feasibility study/market research  
c) Other 







a) Just following g what other firms do (neighbors) 
b) Amount of royalty fee 
c) Based on product life cycle analysis 
d) Experimenting what is best on the location 
e) Producing what buyers demand/ based on market 
research 
f) Other 
With how many varieties 
of roses the firm started 
exporting?  
 
How was the investment 
finance raised?  
 
How was working capital 
raised? 
a) DBE (govt bank) 
b) Locally owned private bank 
c) Sister company 
d) Joint venture-PSOM or other subsides 
e) other 
How did the firm get its 
first buyer? 
auction: 
How did the firm access 
auction? 
Direct sale: 
How did the firm 
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access/establish contact 






What are the main 
features of your 
greenhouse?  
a) mechanical ventilation system  
b) flexible window opening 
c) fixed window opening 
d) Climate registration and sensors 
Why you select the 
specific type of 
greenhouse? 
 
Have you changed your 
greenhouse since first 
time? If yes, when and 
why? 
 
How does the fertigation 
system work in the 
greenhouse? 
 
a) Fertigation at fixed time interval and no automatic 
adjustment  
b) computerized fertigation automatically adjusted 
based on climate data (radiation) 
c) computerized and automatically regulate 
fertigation (amount and proportion) with additional 
sensors  
 
PART III:  END MARKET 
 
Do you know your main 
buyers in auction?  
If Yes, 
How many are they?  
 
Do you have direct contact 
with the auction buyers? 
 
If YES, 
How did you establish that? 
a) Via FloraHolland direct 
b) Other 
How stable are your 
relationships with your 
auction main buyers? 
If a) ask # of years and with 
how many buyers  
a) Stable 
b) Somewhat stable 
a) Ad hoc 
In direct sale, who are main 
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How stable are your 
relationships with your main 
buyers? 
 
If a) ask # of years and with 
how many buyers? 
a) Stable 
b) Somewhat stable 
c) Ad hoc 
What are main difference in 
buyers’ requirements of 
different end-markets?  
 
 
Does the firm has contract 
with direct buyers? If yes, 
give general features: 




How does price determined in 





a. Fixed- cost-price plus 
b. Negotiation based on auction 
c. Other (specify) 
 




b) Middle east 
c) Japan 
d) other 
Which market channel offer 
best price? 
a) Auction 
b) Direct sale 
 




Has the firm engaged in 
market intelligence and 








PART IV: PRODUCT and PRODUCTION PROCESS 
 
Describe the main 





b) Intermediate   
c) Large flower 
d) other 
Average annual internal 
reject rate? 
 
Market place reject rate 
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Average unit price of 
products? 
What is your most 
frequent product 





What measures the firm 
took to improve quality? 
 
 
At what stages do you 
monitor quality in GH 
and PH? 
 
From where or from 
whom do you get advice 




b) Local firms (in a formal/informal settings) 
c) Foreign firms (in a formal/informal settings) 
d) Hired consultants 
e) breeders 
f) EHPEA (growers’ association) 
g) EHDA (government agency) 
h) Other (specify) 




If yes, How?  
a. Via website 
b. Participating in trade fairs (local and 
international) 
c. Printing logo on packages 
d. CSR 
e. Other (specify) 
 What do you do to 
prevent and cure diseases?  
a) Chemical spray,  
b) Integrated pest management (IPM)  
c) Both (a and b) 
d) Other (specify) 
How is supervision of 
workers organized in GH 
and PH? 
 






b) Fill the gap or share surplus from/with 
neighbour/friend farm 
c) Other__ 
How do you deal with 
labour during seasonal 
fluctuation? 
a) Hire casual labour 
b) Engaging them in other work internally 
c)  Sending them temporarily to other firms 
d) Lay off 
e) other 
Do you record data?   
On what issues? 
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EFFICIENCY & PRODUCTIVITY 
Firm’s profit % before 
tax 2015? 
Did the firm incurred 
loss since establishment? 
how many times ?)   
 
# of workers per hectare  
 
 








Share of expatriate 
workers? 
In which positions?  
Development (10 years)? 
 
Have locals increased 





Which group of workers 
do you often hire from 
other farms? 
 
a) General workers 





Unrest downtime?  
 
 
Average per year: 
Average per year: 
Average per year: 
 
Is there a seasonality component? 





What is it? 
Is training offered to 
workers?  
If Yes,  










PART V: SUPPLY CHAIN LINKAGES 
 
Where does firm get 
information from on 
a) Local firms 
b) Foreign firms 






d) Hired consultants 
e) Industry association  
f) Relevant ministry/public institution 
g) Other:   
Is the firm a member of 







How often does it meet? 
Main benefits for your firm? 
Does the firm 
participate in 
collaborative schemes 







If so, what kind of 
schemes (training, input 
sourcing, etc.)? 
a) Limited links with other firms 
b) Medium links 





How often does the firm 
seek knowledge or 
advice from other firms 




a) Not very often 
b) Sometimes 





Do the firm own cold 
truck? 
If no, where do you get 




Do the firm have 
challenges related to 
cool-chain 
management? If yes, 
describe. 
 
Are there challenges 
related to cargo booking 
and handling services? 
If yes, explain 
a) Yes 
No 
What is your relation 
with the handling 
agent/distribution 
a) Buying the service  
b) Joint venture 
c) Other (specify 
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centre at end market? 
Do buyers have 
responsibility in relation 
to logistics? 





How is your 
relationship with 
breeders? Explain 
a) Not good, unable to get certain varieties 
b) Discriminations in accessing certain 
varieties 
c) Good, able to access varieties as wanted  
d) other 
Do you propagate plants 
at your farm? 
 If yes, why? 
 
How do you source 
inputs?  
 











What are the main 





PART VI: FINANCE & SUPPORT 
 
Does the firm have relationships 
with external public & private 
institutions? 
 
Which are most important 
institutions?  
a) Limited links with institutions 
b) Medium links 
c) Close networks 
Does the government (Ministry 
of Industry, industry-specific 
agencies) provide support 
services to the sector?  
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Are they useful? 
Does the firm have access to 






Does the firm interact with any 





Does the firm buy management, 
technical or administrative/IT 







PART VII:  PRODUCT DIVERSIFICATION 
Where and how do you sell the 
new products? 
What changes did you make to 
deal with new products?  
a) Investment
b) Production
c) Supply chains and linkages
What are advantages & 
challenges of working in 
different products and market? 
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